

0 164 0002 0458

DEFENSE DOCUMENT #401

Not used

EXCERPTS FROM "PEACE AND WAR", Official Publication,
Department of State, U.S.A.

EXCERPT

SUMMARY

- (1) The excerpt relates Hull's opposition of an arms embargo against Japan and China or against Japan alone since it would not be effective to reduce Japanese military activities.
- (2) Excerpt giving an account of American statements and actions related to the Geneva disarmament conference in which it is brought out that the U.S. policy was to cooperate in general disarmament but was opposed to using its forces to settle disputes. (This document could possibly be offered to show that the disarmament discussions were hindered by America's being outside the League and unwilling to make full commitments.
- (4) Excerpt states that indications were received that relations between Germany and Japan were becoming closer and were based on the self-interest of each.
- (5) Reports an address of Hull, who states that "nations everywhere" were narrowing their vision, policies, etc.; that international cooperation was being abandoned.
- (6) Exchange between HIROTA and Hull, in which the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs states that no question between the two countries is incapable of solution and Japan has no intention of making trouble. Hull's reply emphasizes the U.S. 's intention of prosecuting the policies pacifically.
- (7) Report of conversation of Japanese Foreign Minister with Grew in which former assures Grew that Japan has no intention of seeking special privilege in China or encroaching on its territorial and administrative integrity.
- (8) Relates how a resolution to join the "world Court failed to pass in the Senate, although urged by President Roosevelt.
- (9) Warning of Hull that there were ominous tendencies in the world and the U.S. could not be assured that they were immune from a possible conflict.
- (10) Hull letter to Congressional Committees urges passing of arms embargo against countries the President deems necessary to proclaim it against as a means to stop aggression. Hull resists an amendment to apply it to all belligerents. PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>
- (11) Account of the Neutrality Act of 1935, and the subsequent remarks of Hull that the Act was inelastic and didn't provide for future contingencies.

SECRET

SUMMARY

- (13) Relates that a proposal to limit exports to belligerents of abnormal quantities of war materials was adopted by Congress and that the Neutrality Act of 1935 was amended to prohibit loans to belligerents.
- (14) Roosevelt in address at Chautauque, N.Y. declares that even peace desiring nations might be drawn into war in spite of neutrality legislation. Hull in an address defends the U.S. policy of refusing to enter into collective security arrangements.
- (15) Relates that Japan withdrew from the London Naval Conference of 1935-36 and that under a clause of the ensuing treaty Britain and the U.S. increased naval building because of Japan's refusal to give assurances.
- (16) Relates that the German-Japanese anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 was the first open association of the two.
- (17) Addresses and announcements of Roosevelt and Hull regarding the necessity for U.S. to maintain its military establishment in an armament world, and that the U.S. is expanding its naval and military forces.
- (18) Statement of Roosevelt that application of Neutrality Act remained in status quo; that merchant vessels supplied Japan or China at their own risk.
- (19) Address of Roosevelt that neutrality offers no escape to any nation in these times; that we must "guarantine" to protect against world lawlessness. Department of State declares Japanese action in Manchuria violates treaty obligations.
- (20) Brussel's Conference declares solution of Japanese Chinese conflict must be settled according to principles of Nine Power Treaty- not by direct negotiations between the two alone.
- (21) Report of the Fany Incident and the subsequent apologies and indemnification by Japan.
- (22) Relates that the Administration opposed a constitutional amendment to require submission to the people of a declaration of war. Roosevelt and Hull urge preference for armaments, which proposals were adopted.
- (23) Roosevelt and Hull urge the building up of the air force and the necessity of providing stock piles of critical materials.
- (24) Declarations of Roosevelt and Hull against the arms embargo legislation.
- (25) Situation rendered difficult by German-Russian non-aggression agreements.

DEFENSE DOCUMENT # 401

EXCERPT

SUMMARY

- (25) Congress repeals the arms embargo.
- (27) Roosevelt declares U.S. will give material aid to the opponents of force, and such aid was undertaken.
- (28) To the appeals of the French government for aid, Roosevelt replies that the U.S. is doing all in its power short of military aid.
- (29) Roosevelt warns the Pétain Government not to surrender the French fleet to Germany, and is assured that it will not be.
- (31) Roosevelt requests for appropriations for the armed forces are granted by Congress.
- (32) Instruction to cooperate with the American republics to further economic self-sufficiency.
- (33) U.S. exchanges destroyers for British bases; passed the Selective Service Act.
- (34) Announcement of the Tri-Partite Pact. Hull tells Britain's Ambassador that U.S. utterances with respect to the Pacific would be affected by the course most effectively and legitimately aiding Great Britain.
- (35) Hull declares U.S. is facilitating the obtaining of supplies by nations defending themselves against barbaric attack.
- (36) Roosevelt declares America threatened and that American production must put forth greater efforts.
- (37) U.S. applies "moral embargo" to aeronautical manufactures in 1938; protests Japanese interference in China; terminates commercial treaty of 1911 with Japan; is assured by Japanese ambassador that Japan will not enter into a pact with Germany and Italy.
- (38) Hull stresses the importance of the Netherlands Indies to the U.S. and the world's economy to the Japanese Ambassador who replies that Japan is satisfied with the status quo there.
- (39) Hull tells Grew of America's military preparations; tells British Ambassador that everything short of war is being done to keep the Japanese situation stabilized, but peace in Asia must not be at the expense of China.
- (40) Hull criticizes the temporary closing of the Burma road by Great Britain.
- (41) Grew reports that Japan is likely to continue her "nibbling policy"; that drastic embargoes might provoke Japanese militarists to retaliate without Government authority; that the U.S. must preserve the status quo in the Pacific by firmness.
- (42) In strong words Hull rejects the Japanese protest to the

DEFENSE DOCUMENT #401EXCERPTSUMMARY

- (43) President's budget message calls for eleven billion dollars for national defense program.
- (44) Congress passes the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 as a means to furnish quick aid to those nations whose defense was deemed vital to U.S. Defense.
- (45) U.S. assures Greece of aid in its fight with Italy. Informs Yugo-Slav Minister that arms production was undertaken on a vast scale to meet British requirements.
- (46) U.S. secures Greenland bases by agreement with Denmark.
- (47) Addresses by Hull and Roosevelt emphasize that the American Way of life is threatened; the need for stepping up shipbuilding to offset merchant ship losses in the Atlantic.
- (48) U. S. attacks collaboration of Vichy government with Germany; extends lease-lend to Free French.
- (49) Information on impending German attack given Soviet Ambassador by Hull.
- (50) By agreement with Iceland, U.S. troops replace British as occupation force to safeguard the Atlantic.
- (51) Roosevelt and Churchill meet in the Atlantic to enunciate joint policy.
- (52) Roosevelt and Churchill pledge aid to Russia.
- (53) Roosevelt announces U-boats in American waters will be sunk.
- (54) Neutrality Act amended to permit U.S. vessels to be armed and to carry cargo anywhere.
- (55) Following torpedoing of a U.S. destroyer, Roosevelt declares the "shoot on sight" order stands, that we are ready to defend ourselves.
- (56) Grew sends a report that the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Hull and Nomura discuss proposals for peace in Asia, the latter assuring Hull his government desires to adopt a peaceful course.
- (57) To an inquiry by the U.S. as to Japanese intentions toward Russia, Japan replies she has not considered joining the hostilities.
- (58) Japan's occupation of Indo-China is offensive movement by U.S. Roosevelt proposes that Japan withdraw and work out an agreement for the commercial neutrality of Indo-China. Roosevelt explains that the shipping of oil to Japan keeps war out of the South Pacific.

0 164 0002 0462

DEFENSE DOCUMENT 401

EXCERPT

SUMMARY

- (59) Roosevelt issues order freezing Japanese assets in the U.S., and commerce with Japan is virtually stopped.
- (60) Japan submits a counter-proposal in re Indo-China in which she demands recognition of her "special status" in Indo-China. Japanese ambassador inquires regarding a meeting between the heads of the two governments.
- (61) At August 1941 conference Roosevelt and Churchill agree on parallel action to warn Japan against new aggressions.
- (62) Roosevelt and Hull warn the Japanese ambassador that further aggressive steps will result in necessary defensive measures by U.S., that conversations cannot be reopened unless Japan abandons its movement of force and conquest.
- (63) Japan proposes a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. U.S. declares that there must be a meeting of minds on essential points first.
- (64) Grew warns of an "imminent possibility" that Japan would start on new conquest. U.S. cabinet members warn the country of grave dangers. Grew warns that Japan would probably use surprise in an attack.
- (65) Kurusu arrives in Washington, but the ensuing conversations disclose he has brought no new material or plans or proposals.
- (66) Hull hands a memorandum to Nomura and Kurusu of a proposed basis of agreement which includes withdrawal of Japanese forces in Indo-China and China. Japanese envoys express disappointment in the proposals.
- (67) Hull emphasizes to U.S. officials that Japan may move suddenly; that the diplomatic phase of relations with Japan is about over.
- (68) In a conference with the Japanese envoys, Hull calls attention to reports of Japanese troop movements in Indo China. The envoys claim the movements are defensive. Hull declares we are not looking for trouble, but will not run away from menaces.
- (69) One hour after the Pearl Harbor attack commenced the Japanese envoys delivered a memorandum bitterly attacking American policies and motives in the Pacific. Grew several hours after the attack receives the same memorandum with the additional comment that peace has been the cherished desire of the Emperor.
- (70) United Nations declare to prosecute war to the fullest and not to make a separate peace with the enemies.

0 164 0002 0463

Defense Document 401 (1)

Handwritten: [unclear]

CONCENTRATION OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION

* * * * *

In the spring of 1933, in connection with proposed legislation to authorize the President under certain conditions to apply embargoes on the export of arms from the United States, consideration was given to the possibility of an arms embargo against Japan. In a statement made on behalf of Secretary of State Hull to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 17, 1933, it was emphasized that the United States Government concurred "in general in the findings of the Lytton Commission which place the major responsibility upon Japan for the international conflict now proceeding in China". In this statement concerning the proposed legislation, Secretary Hull said that it was not the intention of this Government to use the authority as a means of restoring peace between China and Japan. He said that an arms embargo would not be an effective means of restoring peace in this instance; that Japan was an important producer of arms with industries sufficiently developed to supply its own needs; that China was dependent upon her importation of these commodities; that an arms embargo applied to both China and Japan would, therefore, militate against China and in favor of Japan; that an embargo directed against Japan alone would probably result in the seizure by the Japanese of arms intended for China, thus ultimately decreasing China's supply of arms and increasing Japan's supply. The Secretary stated that this Government would not be disposed to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese. Further, he said that we would not under any circumstances agree to participate in an international embargo of this kind unless we had secured substantial guaranties from the Governments of all the great powers which would insure against the effects of any retaliatory measures which the Japanese might undertake.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

The proposed arms-embargo legislation was not enacted.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 7 and 8



Def Loc No. 401 (1)

辯護國文書四〇一(一)

日本の侵略に對する非難

一九三三年（昭和八年）の春、大統領に對し或る種の狀勢の下に於て合衆國の武器輸出を禁止する權限を與ふる法律案と關聯して、日本に對する武器輸出禁止の可能性も考慮された。一九三三年（昭和八年）五月十七日に於けるハル國務長官代理の上院外交委員會に對する聲明の中で合衆國政府は「現在中國に進行中の國際紛争の主なる責任は日本に在るとなすりツトン委員會報告と大体に於て」同意見なる旨が強調されてゐる。同法案に關するこの聲明の中でハル長官は日支間の平和回復の手段としてこの權限を行使することは同政府の意圖する所ではないと述べた更に又武器禁輸は此の場合平和回復の有効な手段ではない日本は重要な武器生産國でその工業は自國の必要を充分に満し得るまでに發達してゐるが、中國は之等の武器の輸入を日本に仰いで居り、従つて武器禁輸を日支兩國に適用すれば、不利となるのは中國であり日本には有利である



Def Doc No. 401 (1)

禁輸を日本のみに限るとしても恐らく中國向けの武器は日本によつて押へられてしまひ、結局中國の武器供給量を減じ日本の供給量を増すことにならうと述べてゐる。長官は、同政府は日本軍の作戰を利するやうな措置を執る氣は毛頭ないと聲明し、更に、此の種の國際的禁輸には、日本がこれに對し執るべき報復手段に對しその效力を保障すべき實質的な保障をすべての大國政府から得られぬ限り、之に参加することには同意しない、と述べた。

同武器輸出禁止法案は、立に至らなかつた。

合衆國國務省公刊「平和と戦争」

第七、八頁より抄出

Def Doc No. 401 (1)

禁輸を日本のみに限るとしても恐らく中國向けの武器は日本によつて押へられてしまひ、結局中國の武器供給量を減じ日本の供給量を増すことにならうと述べてゐる。長官は、同政府は日本軍の作戰を利するやうな措置を執る氣は毛頭ないと聲明し、更に、此の種の國際的禁輸には、日本がこれに對し執るべき報復手段に對しその效力を保障すべき實質的な保障をすべての大國政府から得られぬ限り、之に参加することには同意しない、と述べた。

同武器輸出禁止法案は、立に至らなかつた。

合衆國國務省公刊「平和と戦争」

第七、八頁より抄出

Defense Document 401 (2)

III DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS 1932-34

Statement of February 1932

The first General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments assembled at Geneva in February 1932.

At the Washington Conference of 1922 the principle of limitation had been established by treaty for capital ships of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan; at the London Naval Conference of 1930 this principle was extended to other types of warships of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Prior to the opening of the General Disarmament Conference in 1932, these were the principal steps taken by the nations of the world to lighten the burden of large armies and navies.

At the beginning of this conference Ambassador Hugh Gibson, speaking for the United States delegation, said that civilization was threatened by the burden and dangers of the gigantic machinery of warfare then being maintained. He recalled that practically all the nations of the world had pledged themselves not to wage aggressive war. Therefore, he said, the conference should devote itself to the abolition of weapons devoted primarily to aggressive war. Among the points advocated by Ambassador Gibson were the following: Special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns, which were considered to be arms peculiarly for offensive operations; computation of the number of armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defense; abolition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare; effective measures to protect civilian populations against aerial bombing; abolition of submarines; prolonging the existing naval agreements concluded at Washington and London; proportional reduction from the figures laid down in the Washington and London Agreements.

PROPOSAL OF MAY 16, 1933

For more than a year the Conference at Geneva struggled with the tremendous problems involved -- without making substantial progress. President Roosevelt made an effort in May 1933 to inject new life into the

Conference. In a message of May 16 to the heads of 54 governments he stated that if all nations would agree to eliminate entirely from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defenses automatically would become impregnable and the frontiers and independence of every nation would become secure. Therefore, he said, the ultimate objective of the Conference must be "complete elimination of all offensive weapons". His specific proposals were: Through a series of steps the weapons of offensive warfare should be eliminated; the first definite step should be taken at once; while these steps were being taken no nation should increase existing armaments over and above the limitations of treaty obligations; subject to existing treaty rights no nation should send any armed force of whatsoever nature across its own borders.

Ten days before this message was sent, President Roosevelt had made clear to Dr. Schacht of Germany, President of the Reichsbank, who was in Washington as a special representative of the German Government, that the United States would insist that Germany remain in statu quo in armament and that we would support every possible effort to have the offensive armament of every other nation brought down to the German level. The President intimated as strongly as possible that we regarded Germany as the "only possible obstacle" to a disarmament treaty; that he hoped Dr. Schacht would give this point of view to Hitler.

STATEMENT OF MAY 22, 1933

One of the complications arising from the Disarmament Conference was that France felt that it could not agree to reduce armaments unless the United States and Great Britain would join with France and other nations in a system of collective security to enforce compliance on the part of Germany of provisions for arms limitation and reduction. It was argued that if League states took measures against an aggressor nation, there was no assurance that the United States would not interfere with these measures. In an effort to meet this objection and difficulty, Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States delegation at Geneva, stated to the Conference in an address of May 22, 1933 that the United States was ready not only to do its

part toward the substantive reduction of armaments but that if this were effected by general international agreement, the United States was prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular we were willing to consult other states in case of a threat to peace, with the view to averting conflict. Furthermore, in the event that the states, in conference, determined that a state had been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and took measures against the violator, then the United States, if it concurred in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, would refrain from any action tending to defeat this collective effort for a restoration of peace.

A few days later the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations rejected a proposal, urged by the Secretary of State, which would have permitted this Government to join with other governments in an arms embargo against an aggressor nation. (See page 23.)

During a conversation on October 9, 1933 Secretary of State Hull discussed with the German Ambassador at Washington, Hans Luther, the question of disarmament. The Secretary said that the purpose of the United States was the promotion of general disarmament; that the theory of this Government was that we should "wage a steady contest for the disarmament of the heavily armed nations, rather than become parties to a plan for others to proceed to rearm".

A plan was considered by the Disarmament Conference for certain immediate steps of disarmament and for progressive limitation and reduction of armaments. France proposed that instead of agreeing to steps being taken immediately and progressively there should be a period of trial in which to test German good faith. Germany refused to accept this proposal. On October 14, 1933 Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and on the same day gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations. <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

* * * * *

The Conference continued at Geneva, without substantial progress. Twenty-seven months after its opening, Chairman Norman H. Davis of the United States delegation made an address to the Conference surveying the disarmament situation. In this address of May 29, 1934 Mr. Davis summarized

Def. Doc. # 401 (2)

- 4 -

as follows the attitude and policy of the United States: "We are prepared to cooperate in every practicable way in efforts to secure a general disarmament agreement and thus to help promote the general peace and progress of the world. We are furthermore willing, in connection with a general disarmament convention, to negotiate a universal pact of non-aggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party. The United States will not, however, participate in European political negotiations and settlements and will not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute anywhere. In effect, the policy of the United States is to keep out of war, but to help in every possible way to discourage war."

JAPANESE DENUNCIATION OF NAVAL TREATY OF 1922

At the end of 1934 the Japanese Government gave notice of intention to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 9, 10, 11 and 12

not used

REPORTED GERMAN-JAPANESE ENTENTE

Throughout this period indications were received by this Government from various sources that Germany and Japan were drawing together in closer relations. The two countries were in similar situations in that each had left the League of Nations and each was already engaged in preparing militarily and otherwise a program of national expansion. In May 1934 the United States Military Attache in Berlin, Lieutenant Colonel Guest, reported that evidence was accumulating which tended "to show the existence of unusually close and friendly relations between Germany and Japan even to the extent of a possible secret alliance". This report stated further that these friendly relations between the two countries were dependent entirely upon self-interest; that the Germans usually expressed themselves to the effect that "we are encouraging close and friendly relations with Japan because it is to our advantage to do so but we must never forget that we are white people and they are not".

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 16

NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION

In 1935 there developed considerable public support in the United States for an embargo on the export of arms to belligerents as a means of keeping the United States out of war. This support was based on the fallacious concept that the entrance of the United States into the World War in 1917 had been brought about by the sale of arms to belligerents. Under the influence of this concept and with the shadow of a new European war on the horizon the Congress passed a joint resolution in August 1935 providing that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between or among two or more foreign states "the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war" from the United States to any belligerent country. This legislation also contained provisions for the licensing of arms exports, the prohibition of the carriage by United States vessels of arms to belligerent states, and the restriction of travel by United States citizens on vessels of belligerent states. This joint resolution, known as the Neutrality Act, was signed by President Roosevelt on August 31, 1935. In signing it the President said he had done so "because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war". However, he said that the "inflexible" arms-embargo provisions "might drag us into war instead of keeping us out"; that no Congress and no Executive could foresee all possible future situations.

A few months later Secretary Hull, in referring to the Neutrality Act, warned that to assume that by placing an embargo on arms we were making ourselves secure from dangers of conflict with belligerent countries was "to close our eyes to manifold dangers in other directions". He said further that every war presented different circumstances and conditions which might have to be dealt with differently; that, therefore, there were apparent difficulties inherent in any effort to lay down by legislative enactment "inelastic rules or regulations to be applied to every situation that may arise"; that the Executive should not be unduly or unreasonably handicapped; that discretion could wisely be given the President.

* * * * *

Def Doc No 401-11

中立方法

一九三五年米國に於ては米國が戦争に捲き込まれない様にする一手段として、交戦國への武器轉出禁止に對し注目すべき一般の支持があつた。此の賛成論は米國の一九一七年の世界戦争参加は交戦國への武器賣渡から齎らされたと云ふ誤つた考へに基いてゐる。此の考への影響を受け又今や正に勃發せんとしつゝある新歐洲戦争の影をふびて、議會は一九三五年八月に共同決議を通過させ、之に依り二國若くはそれ以上の外國間の戦争の勃發に當り若くは戦争進展中に「大統領は右事實を宣言するであらうし、從つて」米國から如何なる交戦國に對しても「武器、軍需品若くは戦争用具を轉出することは非合法となるであらう」と規定した。此立法は亦武器轉出の認可、米國商船による交戦國家に對する武器賣出の禁止、並に交戦國の船舶による米國市民の旅行制限に關する規定を含んでゐた。此共同決議は中立法として知られてゐるが、一九三五年八月三十一日ルーズベルト大統領に依り署名された。

D E F . D O C . # 401-(11)

JAN 100

此署名に際し大統領は彼が認可をなした理由は「蓋しそれは我々を戦争に捲き込む虞ある如何なる行爲をも避ける爲、政府並に米國民の確固たる希望を表現する爲に、なされるものだからである。」と述べた。然し彼は「柔軟性のない」武器禁轉規定は「我々を戦争の外に保つ代りに戦争に引きずり込むかもしれない。」又議會も行政府も凡てのあり得べき將來の情勢を見透すことは出来ないのであらうと述べた。

D EF.D OC. # 401-(11)

数日后ハル長官は中立法に言及して武器禁輸をなすことに依り我々が交戦國との戦争の危険から我々自身を保障してゐることを考へることは、「他の諸方面に於ける種々の危険に對し我々の目を蓋ふこと」であると言告した。彼は更に曰く、凡ゆる戦争は夫々異つた環境と状態を呈し、夫等は各異つた取扱ひを受けねばならないかもしれない。従つて起りうべき凡ての状況に適用するために弾力性のない規則若くは法規を制定しようとするには必ず明白なる困難が伴つた。行政府は不正不當に拘束せらるべきでない。決定權は須く大統領に與へられるであらう。と。

米國國務省公刊

「平和と戦争」抜萃（二四頁）

VI DEVELOPING DANGERS 1936-37

Warnings by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull

* * * * *

In line with the policy enunciated by the President of restricting the export to belligerents of abnormal quantities of war materials, which had been urged by the Government since the beginning of the war between Italy and Ethiopia, a "neutrality" bill containing such a provision was introduced in Congress in January 1936. Secretary of State Hull, in supporting this proposal before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, emphasized that a neutral should not "deliberately help to feed the fires and flames of war" by delivering essential materials to belligerents, thus helping "not only to carry on war but to prolong it indefinitely". This proposal was not adopted by the Congress.

By a joint resolution approved February 29, 1936 the Neutrality Act of 1935 was amended to prohibit persons in the United States from making loans or extending credits to belligerents. Upon signing this joint resolution President Roosevelt referred to the fact that the "high moral duty" which he had urged on our people of restricting their exports of essential war materials to either belligerent to approximately the normal peacetime basis had not been the subject of legislation. Nevertheless, he said, it was clear that greatly to exceed that basis "would serve to magnify the very evil of war which we seek to prevent". Therefore, the President renewed the appeal to the people of the United States "that they so conduct their trade with belligerent nations that it cannot be said that they are seizing new opportunities for profit or that by changing their peacetime trade they give aid to the continuation of war".

* * * * *

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

日進展する危険（一九三六—三七年）

ルーズベルト大統領並にハル長官の警告

多量の戦争資材の對交戦國輸出制限政策は大統領が開言し、且つ伊太利・エチオピア戦争勃發以來政府が唱へて來たものであるが、右政策の線に沿つた規定を含む「中立」法案が一九三六年一月に議會に提出された。ハル國務長官は上院の外交委員會の前で、此提案を支持して、中立國は交戦國に對し重要資材を提供し、斯くて「戦争を續行するのみならずそれを無限に永びかせること」を助長することに依つて「戦争の火焰を擴大する爲に故意に力をかすべきではない」と強調した。此提案中は議會の採用することとならなかつた。

一九三六年二月二十九日可決された共同決議に依つて、一九三五年の中立法は改正され、米國に在る自然人法人が交戦國に貸付をなし若くはクレジットを提供することを禁止した。ルーズベルト大統領は右の共同決議に署名するに當り言及して曰く、大統領が米國民に對し、交戦國双方に重要



Def Doc No. 401 (13)

只道屢する危険ハ一九三六―三七年一

ルーズベルト大統領並にハル長官の警告

多量の戦争資材の對交戦國輸出制限政策は大統領が開言し、且つ伊太利・エチオピア戦争勃發以來政府が唱へて來たものであるが、右政策の線に沿つた規定を含む「中立」法案が一九三六年一月に議會に提出された。ハル國務長官は上院の外交委員會の前で、此提案を支持して、中立國は交戦國に對し重要資材を提供し、斯くて「戦争を續行するのみならずそれを無限に永びかせること」を助長することに依つて「戦争の火焰を擴大する爲に故意に力をかすべきではない」と強調した。此提案中は議會の採用することとならなかつた。

一九三六年二月二十九日可決された共同決議に依つて、一九三五年の中立法は改正され、米國に在る自然人法人が交戦國に貸付をなし若くはクレジットを提供することを禁止した。ルーズベルト大統領は右の共同決議に署名するに當り言及して曰く、大統領が米國民に對し、交戦國双方に重要



Def Doc No. 401 (13)

not used

戦争資材輸出を略々平時の基準に制限する様促した所の「高い道徳的義務」はこの立法の題目ではなかつた、と。然し乍ら、彼は此の平時基準を甚だしく超過することは「我々が防止せんと力めてゐる戦争の害悪そのものを増大せしめるに役立つであらう」とことは明らかである、と云つた。それ故に大統領は米國民に再び訴へて曰く「交戦國と貿易するに當つて、米國人は、新しい利益を得る機会を掴まへやうとしてゐるか、或は、平和貿易を切り棄へることにより戦争の繼續に助力してゐる」とか云はれないやう注意して貰ひたい」と。

米國國務省 公刊

「平和と戦争」抜萃（三四頁）

Defense Document 401 (14)

ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND SECRETARY HULL

On August 14, 1936 President Roosevelt delivered an address at Chautauqua, New York, in which he declared that the United States had sought steadfastly to assist international movements to prevent war. The President said that we shunned political commitments which might entangle the United States in foreign wars; that we avoided connection with the political activities of the League of Nations but had cooperated wholeheartedly in the social and humanitarian work at Geneva. He said that we were not isolationists "except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war"; that we must remember that so long as war existed there would be some danger that even the nation most ardently desiring peace might be drawn into war; and that no matter how well we were supported by neutrality legislation, we must remember that no laws could be provided to cover every contingency.

In an address delivered at Washington on September 7, 1936 Secretary of State Hull gave pointed warning of the threat to peace which was mounting throughout the world. He said that in all history the weight of the responsibility of governments and peoples to preserve the peace had never been so great. He warned that if war came it would be fought not alone by uniformed armies and navies, but by the entire populations of the countries involved; that airplanes, poison gas, and other modern fighting equipment would make the world a "veritable inferno". He believed that a general war would set loose forces that would be beyond control; that these forces might bring about a virtual destruction of modern political thought and possibly a shattering of our civilization.

The one hope of the world, he said, was that governments and peoples might fully realize the solemn responsibility resting upon all of them and that realistic envisaging of the inevitable consequences would "prevent their flying at each other's throats".

In an address of the following week, Secretary Hull dealt with the criticism that the United States declined to depart from its traditional

policy and join with other governments in collective arrangements carrying the obligation of employing force, if necessary, in case disputes with other countries brought them into war. He declared that we could not accept that responsibility, which carried with it direct participation in the political relations of the whole world, because current experience indicated how uncertain was the possibility that we could vitally influence the policies or activities of other countries from which war might come. He said that the statesmen of the world should continue their effort to effect security by arrangements which would prove more durable than those which had been broken.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 36 and 37

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

At the London Naval Conference of 1935-36 Japan endeavored to have substituted for the 5-5-3 ratio of the naval treaties of 1922 and 1930 a "common upper limit" for all powers. This proposal would have established a uniform maximum level for fleets of all nations without taking into consideration their respective needs and responsibilities. None of the other states represented could accept this proposal even as a basis for negotiation. The United States opposed the Japanese proposal, according to a statement by Chairman Norman H. Davis of the United States delegation, on the ground that "equal security" had been achieved under the Washington and London Naval Treaties and that, owing to the difference in relative needs and vulnerability, "naval parity would give to Japan naval superiority". Japan withdrew from the Conference and as a result no quantitative naval limitation treaty was concluded. Despite the departure of the Japanese representatives from the Conference, the United States, Great Britain, and France concluded a treaty of qualitative naval limitation on March 25, 1936. The treaty provided, however, that if the national security of a contracting party should be menaced by naval construction by powers outside the scope of the treaty, it could depart from the qualitative limits.

At the time of the signature of the treaty, Chairman Davis of the United States delegation and British Foreign Secretary Eden exchanged letters declaring that there would be no competitive naval building between the two countries and that the principle of parity would be maintained as between their Fleets. Subsequently Japan was approached by the British Government and asked to give assurances that it would adhere in practice to the qualitative limits laid down in the 1936 treaty. Japan declined to give such assurances. Japan's attitude marked the death knell, for the period under consideration, of naval limitation among the great powers.

The United States and Great Britain later invoked the "escalator" clause of the treaty and undertook increased naval buildings programs.

* * * * *

Defense Document 401 (16)

not used

GERMAN-JAPANESE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

* * * * *

On November 25, 1936 Japan openly associated itself with Germany by the signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact, whereby the two countries agreed to exchange information on the activities of the Communist International and to consult and collaborate on the necessary preventive measures. While there had been signs for some time of a gradual rapprochement of these two states, this was the first open indication of their common designs in foreign policy.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 39

NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION

It has been mentioned that President Roosevelt in his address to Congress on January 4, 1939 criticized neutrality legislation which might actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim. This neutrality legislation, enacted in 1935 and amended in 1936 and 1937, contained as its principal feature a rigid embargo on the export of arms to belligerents.

By 1939 it was clear that the arms-embargo provision was exerting an injurious effect on the world peace structure. Germany, which had been furiously arming since the Nazis came to power in 1933, had become the strongest military power in Europe. Great Britain, France, and other states which feared they were to be the next objects of Nazi aggression were re-arming swiftly, but their late start handicapped them in attempting to overtake a heavily armed Germany. Accordingly, they turned to the arms industry in the United States as a source of supply, especially for aircraft in which German numerical superiority was particularly marked. With the arms-embargo provision of the Neutrality Act on the statute books this source of supply would be cut off as soon as war should break out. The advantages accruing to Germany from this arms-embargo legislation were thus clear.

In a letter of May 27, 1939 to the appropriate committees of Congress, Secretary Hull urged removal of the arms embargo, and at the same time suggested other provisions to prevent the loss of American lives and American property by belligerent action. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives reported out a bill substantially in line with the program outlined in this letter. However, in the House of Representatives an arms-embargo provision was inserted in the bill, which passed the House on June 30. On the following day Secretary Hull urged again the adoption of the proposal of May 27, which he considered not only best calculated to keep the United States out of war in the event that war came,

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Def. Doc. # 401 (24)

- 2 -

but also, "what is all important at this time, best calculated to make a far greater contribution than could the present law or its equivalent toward the discouragement of the outbreak of war".

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on July 11, 1939, decided by a close vote to defer action on neutrality legislation until the next session of Congress. Three days later, President Roosevelt strongly recommended to Congress that in the light of world conditions it was highly advisable that Congress should enact the neutrality legislation without delay. With the President's message to Congress there was transmitted a statement by Secretary Hull urging enactment of the program proposed on May 27. The Secretary said further that peace was so precious and war so devastating that the people of the United States and their Government must not fail to make a just and legitimate contribution to the preservation of peace. In the grave conditions then existing in the world, Secretary Hull believed that the first great step toward keeping the United States out of war was to use our influence so as to make a major war less likely.

The Secretary made clear that those who supported the elimination of the arms embargo were convinced that the embargo played into the hands of the nations which had taken the lead in building up their fighting power. The arms embargo worked directly against the interests of the peace-loving nations, the Secretary said, especially those which did not possess their own munitions plants. It meant, he said, that if any country was disposed toward conquest and devoted its energies and resources to establish itself as a superior fighting power, that country might be more tempted to try the fortunes of war if it knew that less well-prepared opponents would be shut off from supplies.

On July 18 a statement was issued by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull that failure to take action "would weaken the leadership of

0164 0002 0486

Def. Doc. # 401 (24)

- 3 -

the United States in exercising its potent influence in the cause of preserving peace among other nations in the event of a new crisis in Europe between now and next January". No further action, however, was taken on neutrality legislation by the Congress at that session.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 63, 64 and 65

辯護圖書證四〇一號(24)

中立立法

一九三九年一月四日にルーズベルト大統領は對議會演説に於て中立立法
 之は實際には侵略者に援助を與へ、犠牲者には之を否するかも知れな
 いものであるが、之を批判したことは實に述べた。此の中立立法は一九三五
 年に制定され一九三六年及び三十七年に改正されたが、其の主要條款とし
 て交戦國への武器輸出の嚴重なる禁止といふことを含んでゐた。

一九三九年迄には武器禁輸規定は世界の平和機構に有害なる影響を與へ
 てゐるといふ事が明らかになつた。

獨逸は、ナチスが一九三三年に政權を取つて以來、武装に邁進してゐた
 が、歐洲に於ける最強の軍事國となつた。

ナチ侵略の次の目標となることを恐れてゐた英國、佛蘭西及び其他の諸
 國は急速に再武装しつゝあつたがその出發が遅れたことは充分に武装せ
 る獨逸を凌駕せんとする企てに於ても不利な状態を齎した。従つて其れ



等諸國は米國軍需産業に供給源として目をつけ、就中獨逸が其の數的優勢を特に誇つてゐた飛行機について然りであつた。中立法の武器禁輸規定が成文法書類に記載されてゐる限り此の供給源は戦争が勃發するや否や斷たれてしまふであらう。此の武器禁輸立法によつて獨逸が得る所の利益は斯様に明白なものであつた。

ハル長官は議會の關係各委員會宛の一九三九年五月二十七日書翰に於て武器禁輸撤廢を唱へ、同時に交戰行爲によつて蒙る米國人の生命並に財産の損害を防止する他の規定を提案した。下院外交委員會は實質に於て該書翰に概略示された案の線に沿つた一法案を報告した。然し乍ら下院に於ては武器禁輸規定は法案の中に挿入され、右法案が下院を六月三十日に通過した。翌日ハル長官は再び五月二十七日案の採用を提唱したが彼は、此案は戦争が起つた場合米國を局外に保つ最良の方法であると考えたのみならず亦一時時局に於て最重要なこととして、現行法やそれに類するものが戦争勃發の抑制に對してなし得るよりも遙かに大なる貢獻をなすに最もよく適したものである」と考へたのであつた。

上院の對外關係委員會は一九三七年七月十一日に投票儘かの差を以て中立立法に關する行動を次期議會迄延期することを決定した。

三日後にルーズベルト大統領は世界の現狀に照して議會は遲滯なく中立立法を制定することが非常に望ましい旨議會に對し強く提言した。大統領の議會へのメッセーヂと共に、ハル長官は聲明を傳へ五月二十七日に提案された案の施行を勸唱した。長官は更に曰く、平和は頗る貴重なものであり戰爭は非常に壊滅的である故に米國民並に米國政府は平和維持に對する公正にして合法的な貢獻を必遂すべきである。と。世界の當時の重大なる情勢の中にあつて、ハル長官は米國を戰爭外に保つた大切な第一歩は、一大戰爭が起らない様に米國の勢力を用ひることであると信じてゐた。

長官は武器禁輸撤廢を支持する人々は該禁止が、率先して戦力を築き上げた諸國家を儲けさせるものであることを確信してゐる旨明らかにした。長官は武器禁輸は平和愛好國家特に自らの軍需工場を有たない其等の國家の利害關係に對して直接に不利に働くと云つたその意味する所は

Def. Doc. 401 (24)

若しも何れの國でも征服の野心を有ち自國を優秀な軍事國となすべく擧げてその精力と資源とを費すならば、其の國は若し準備不充分的敵國が供給源を遮斷されるであらうことを知れば一層誘惑を感じて戦争による幸運を賭するやうになるかも知れないといふことである、と述べた。

七月十八日にルーズベルト大統領並にハル長官は聲明を發して曰く、何等の行動をも取らないならば夫は「現在から來年の一月迄の間に歐洲の新危機が生じた場合、米國が他の諸國家間に平和を維持せんとする目的の爲にその有力な勢力を行使するに當りその主導權を弱めることになる。」と。然し乍ら其の期の議會に於ては中立立法に關して何等の行動もとられなかつた。

Defense Document 401 (25)

Not Used

AUGUST CRISIS

* * * * *

On August 21, 1939 the situation was rendered even more critical by the announcement in Berlin that Germany and Russia had agreed to sign a non-aggression treaty.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 65

Defense Document 401 (26)

not used 38

* * * * *

The President took steps at once to prepare the Nation to meet the shock of war. On September 5 [1939] he proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and, in accordance with the provisions of the Neutrality Act, placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to the belligerents. A few days later he proclaimed a limited national emergency and issued orders for increasing the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.

The President summoned Congress to convene in extra session on September 21. In an address to the Congress he recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our citizens and our ships be kept out of dangerous areas in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. Public opinion in the United States rallied in support of this program. After a few weeks of debate there was enacted into law on November 4 substantially the program of May 27, with the addition of provisions prohibiting the arming of United States merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade and prohibiting such vessels from carrying cargoes to belligerent ports. With the repeal of the arms embargo, large shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, could be shipped to Europe for use in defense against Nazi aggression.

* * * * *

not used

大統領は戦争のショックに應ずべく國家體制を整へる處致をした。
（一九三九年）九月五日に彼は米國の中立を宣言し、又中立法の規定に従つて交戦國への武器輸出を禁止した。後日彼大統領は部分的國家非常時態勢を宣言し、陸海軍及海兵隊増強の命令を發した。

大統領は九月二十一日に臨時議會を招集し、議會での演説に於いて、彼は武器禁輸を廢止し、又米國を戦争に捲き込む虞ある戦争を防止する爲、米國市民並に船舶は危險區域外に往かなければならぬと提唱した。米國の輿論は此の案を壓倒的に支持した。數週間の討論の後、大體五月二十七日の案が、十一月四日に卒に可決された。唯右の案には外國貿易に用ひられる米國商船の武装化を禁止し、且つ該船舶が交戦國の港に貨物を輸送することを禁止する規定が附加された。武器禁輸の廢止と共に、飛行機其他の兵器の多量を其等的大部分は戦争勃發前英國及び佛國から注文されたものであるが、ナチスの侵略防禦に用ひる爲歐洲に輸出することが出来るやうになつた。

米國國務省公刊 「平和と戦争」抜萃（六七頁）

UNITED STATES AID TO OPPONENTS OF FORCE

President Roosevelt in an address of June 10, 1940 at Charlottesville, Virginia, declared that we as a nation -- and likewise all the other American nations -- were convinced that "military and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would endanger the institutions of democracy in the western world" and that all of our sympathies were with those nations that were giving their lifeblood in combat against these forces. He stated that two obvious and simultaneous courses would be followed: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense."

The President stated in this address that Italy had now chosen to fulfil its promises to Germany; that in so doing it had manifested disregard for the rights and security of other nations and had evidenced its unwillingness to find peaceful means for satisfaction of what it believed to be its legitimate aspirations; that "the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor".

In line with the policy of extending aid to the opponents of force, the Government of the United States took immediate steps to send to the British and French large quantities of aircraft, rifles, field artillery, machine-guns, and ammunition.

* * * * *

FRENCH APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES

On June 10, 1940 the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, made a direct appeal to the President for increased aid, at the same time expressing gratitude for the decision of the United States to send assistance in aviation and arms. The Premier said that the French would fight in front of Paris; would fight behind Paris; would close themselves in one of their provinces to fight and if driven out of it would establish themselves in North Africa to continue the fight, and if necessary, in French possessions in America. He urgently requested the President to declare publicly that the United States would give the allies aid and materiel support by all means "short of an expeditionary force".

President Roosevelt replied on June 13 that the Government of the United States was doing everything in its power to make available to the allied governments the materiel they urgently required and that our efforts to do still more were being redoubled; we were doing this because of our faith in and our support of the ideals for which the allies were fighting. The President said he was particularly impressed by the Premier's declaration that France would continue to fight on behalf of democracy, although it meant slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and across the Atlantic. He said it was important to remember that the French and British Fleets continued to have mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans and that vital materials from the outside world were necessary to maintain all armies.

The French Premier sent another message to the President on June 14, 1940, the day on which German troops entered Paris. The Premier said that "at the most tragic hour" of its history France must choose whether to continue resistance or ask for an armistice. He said that the defeat of Great Britain appeared possible if not probable. The Premier said that the only chance of saving France, and through her to save Great Britain, was to throw into the balance "this very day the weight of American power". Finally, the Premier said that if the President could not

PURL <http://www.gha.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Doc. # 401 (28)

- 2 -

give to France in the hours to come the certainty that the United States would enter the war within a very short time, "the fate of the world will change". "Then," he said, "you will see France go under like a drowning man and disappear after having cast a last look towards the land of liberty from which she sought salvation."

President Roosevelt replied on the following day. He repeated emphatically that the Government of the United States had made it possible for the allied armies to obtain, during the weeks that had just passed, airplanes, artillery, and munitions of many kinds, and that so long as the allied governments continued to resist, this Government would redouble its efforts in that direction. He believed it was possible to say that every passing week would see additional war supplies on the way to the allied nations. The President said that in accordance with our policy not to recognize the results of conquests of territory acquired through military aggression, the United States would not consider as valid any attempts to infringe by force the independence and territorial integrity of France.

President Roosevelt assured the Premier that so long as the French people continued a defense of their liberty, so long would they rest assured that war supplies would be sent to them from the United States in ever-increasing quantities and kinds. He said, however, that these statements did not carry any implication of military commitments, that only Congress could make such commitments.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 74 and 75

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

FALL OF FRANCE

On June 17 the French Cabinet, headed by the new Premier, Marshal Pétain, asked for the terms of an armistice with Germany.

On that day President Roosevelt sent a message to the French Government regarding the disposition of the French Fleet. He said that should the French Government, before concluding an armistice with the Germans, fail to see that the Fleet was kept out of the hands of France's opponents, the French Government would be pursuing a policy which would fatally impair the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence. Furthermore, the President said, should the French Government fail to take steps to prevent the French Fleet from being surrendered to Germany, "the French Government will permanently lose the friendship and good-will of the Government of the United States".

On the following day, June 18, the United States Government received from the French Government a categorical assurance that the French Fleet would "never be surrendered to the enemy".

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 76

0 164 0002 0498

38
Defense Document 401 (32)

NOT USED

PANAMA CONFERENCE

* * * * *

* * * The Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, which had been provided for at Panama in 1939, was instructed to cooperate with each of the republics in the study of possible measures for increasing domestic consumption of its own exportable surpluses, to provide increased markets among the American nations for these surpluses, and to create instruments for the temporary storing, financing, and handling of any such commodities and for their orderly marketing.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 79

ACQUISITION OF DESTROYERS FOR FASLS

An important step for the defense of the Western Hemisphere was taken early in September 1940 when an agreement between the United States and Great Britain was concluded whereby Great Britain received fifty over-age United States destroyers, and the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. President Roosevelt reported to Congress that this agreement was not in any way inconsistent with our status of peace; that it was not a threat against any nation; that it was "an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger". The President said that the value to the Western Hemisphere "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation". He considered them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our Eastern and Gulf seaboards. This Government later announced that the resulting facilities at these bases would be made available to all American republics for the common defense of the hemisphere.

During this month the United States took another important step for national defense. On September 16, 1940 was enacted the Selective Service and Training Act. For the first time in its history the United States adopted compulsory military training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. The act included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States territories and possessions.

* * * * *

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
 Official publication
 Department of State, U. S. A.
 Pages 80 and 81

Jleg Doc # 401 (33)

NOT A

辯護圖書類四〇一（五三）

驅逐を基地と交換

一九四〇年昭和十五年九月初旬に西半球防衛の重大措置が講ぜられた、即ち同月米英兩國間に協定が成立し之に依り英國は米國の老朽艦艇五十隻を譲受け、米國はニニーフアウランド、英領ギブニア、ルムダ、バハマ、ジャマイカ、聖ルシア、トマリグッド、アンティグア各諸島の海空軍基地を租借する權利を獲得したのである。ルーズベルト大統領は議會に對して、本協定が我々の平和態勢決して矛盾するものでなく、如何なる國家に對しても脅威とはならず、「重大なる危機に直面して大陸を守るための劃期的且遠大なる準備行爲」に外ならぬと報告した。又大統領曰く、「此の安全保障の前哨點が西半球に對して有する價值は測り知れないものがある」と。彼は之を以てパナマ運河、中米、南米の北部アビサル列島、カナダ、メキシコ及び我が東部並にメキシコ灣沿岸の防禦のために必要不可欠のものと考へたのである。同政府は更に、本協定により之等の基地に設けらるる施設

ref doc #40/ (33)

は全米洲共和国により西半球防衛のため利用せらるべき旨聲明した
此の月、米國は更に同法上の重大措置を別に轉じた。一九四〇年九月十六
日に選拔任務訓練法が制定された。米國は有史以來茲に始めて、平時に於
ける強制軍事教練を採用したのである。同法は、隨軍に編入せられた者は
米國領土を除き西半球以外の地に勤務せしめられることがない旨の規定を
合んでゐた。

米國國務省公刊「平和と戦争」一八〇乃至八一頁抜萃

Not Used

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN

In 1934 and 1935 reports had reached this Government that Japan and Germany were contemplating or had consummated some sort of an agreement for joint action. In 1936 these powers had joined together publicly in the Anti-Comintern Pact. A year later Italy had become a party to this agreement. During the next three years it had become clear to the world that these three countries were pursuing a common pattern of aggression in both Europe and the Far East. On September 11, 1940, in a conversation with French Ambassador Henry-Ribbentrop, Secretary Hull declared that for several years the United States had pursued the fixed policy of basing all utterances and action on the assumption that "Hitler was out to become the ruthless and utterly destructive conqueror of Europe, and that the Japanese military clique was bent on the same course in the Pacific area from Hawaii to Siam".

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy, and Japan signed a far-reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.

On the day the alliance was announced Secretary Hull said that its consummation did not substantially alter a situation which had existed for several years, that the agreement had been in process of conclusion for some time, and that the announcement merely made clear to all a relationship which had long existed in effect.

0 164 00002 0503

Def. Doc. # 401 (34) - 2 -

In a conversation on September 30 with the British Ambassador, Secretary Hull declared that the three-power alliance had come about primarily because of "Hitler's effort to divert attention from his failure to invade Great Britain and to preserve his prestige by a sensational announcement of something that already existed". The Secretary said it was certain that Japan would assume that, whether or not the United States and Great Britain had definite agreements in regard to naval and air bases in the Pacific including Singapore, the special relations between these two countries were such that they could overnight easily establish cooperative relations for the mutual use of all these bases. The relations among Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation, and seizure, had been during recent years on the "basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation" for all practical purposes.

The Secretary emphasized to the Ambassador that the special desire of this Government was to see Great Britain succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the Pacific area would be more or less affected by the question what course would most effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning the war.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 81 and 82

0164 0002 0504

not used

Defense Document 401 (35)

SECRETARY HULL'S ADDRESS OF OCTOBER 26

* * * * *

* * * as an important means of strengthening our own defense and of preventing attack on any part of the Western Hemisphere, the United States was affording all possible facilities for the obtaining of supplies by nations which, while defending themselves against barbaric attack, were checking the spread of violence and thus reducing the danger to us. Under our "inalienable right of self-defense", he said, we intended to continue this to the greatest possible extent.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 83



PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S "PERSONAL OF DEMOCRACY" ADDRESS

In an address of December 29, 1940 President Roosevelt stated that the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear that they intended not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave the whole of Europe and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. The United States, he said, had no right or reason to encourage talk of peace until the day should come when there was a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world. Although some of our people liked to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, the President said, it was a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain went down, the Axis powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, and the high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It was no exaggeration to say that all of us in the Americas "would be living at the point of a gun -- a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military".

There was danger ahead, the President warned, danger against which we must prepare. "We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency, and in it we must 'integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression.'" He had, he said, set up a more effective organization to direct our efforts to increase our production of munitions. American industrial genius, unmatched throughout the world in the solution of production problems, had been called upon to bring its resources and talents into action. Manufacturers of peacetime articles were now making instruments of war. But, he said, all our present efforts were not enough. "We must have more ships, more guns, more planes; we must be the great 'personal of democracy'".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

0.164 0002 0506

not used

譯説則文書四〇一（三六）

ロイズベルト大統領の「民主主義の工廠」演説一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十二月二十九日の演説で、ロイズベルト大統領は獨逸のナチ領袖が自國の全生活と思想とを支配するばかりでなく全歐羅巴を奴隸化し更に歐羅巴の資源を用ゐて爾餘の世界を支配せんとして居ることは明瞭となつたと語つて居る。彼は曰く侵略側で世界を支配又は征服せんとするさうゆる思想を抛棄する意圖が明らかとなる時か来るまでは、合衆國は平和會談を進める權利もなければ理由もない。我が國民の或者は歐羅巴及亞細亞に於る戰爭は我々には關係が無いと信じたかつて居るけれど、歐羅巴及亞細亞戰爭の製造者が西半球に通ずる大洋の支配權を獲得してはならないといふことは我々にとり最も大切な關心事であると大統領は云つて居る。若し大英帝國が没落したなら、權軸諸國は歐羅巴、亞細亞、阿弗利加、濠洲の諸大國と大洋とを支配し我が半球に對し強大なる陸海軍力を齎すに到るであらう。亞米利加にある我々は總て「經濟」上にも將又軍需上に於ても、銃の尖端に、而も發火する彈丸を元顧した銃の元に生きる」ものであると云つたとて



過言ではない。

危険は目前にある、我々はその危険に對して備へなければならぬと大統領は警めてゐる。我々は我國自体の國防を至上の急務として手配して居る、そして此の國防計畫の一部として「侵略に對抗する英國及爾他自由國の戰備を完全にしなければならぬ。假は又次の様に云つて居る。大統領は軍需品増産に效果的な組織を拵へた。生産といふ問題に關する限り全世界を通じて比肩するものはない、亞米利加産業の優秀性は産業資源と技能の活用に動員せられた。平時商品の製造者は今や戰爭片具を作つて居る。が我々の現在の努力は總て充分でない。我々は更にもつと多くの銃砲を、もつと多くの飛行機を持たなければならぬ。我々は偉大なる「民主主義の工廠」でなければならぬ。

米國合衆國國務院刊行「平和と戰爭」八三／八四頁より抜萃。

0 164 0002 0509

Not used

Defense Document 401 (33)

STATUS OF NETHERLANDS INDIES

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 naturally affected and complicated the situation in the Pacific. In April 1940 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement expressing concern on the part of his Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. In April 17 Secretary Hull stated that the Netherlands Indies were an important factor in the commerce of the whole world; that they produced considerable portions of the world's supplies of important commodities, such as rubber, quinine, and copra; that many countries, including the United States, depended substantially upon them for these commodities. Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would, the Secretary said, "be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area".

Three days later, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary stated that there was no more resemblance between our Monroe Doctrine and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of Japan than there was between black and white. Our Monroe Doctrine, he said, contemplated only steps for our physical safety, while Japan's doctrine was seemingly applicable to all other purposes and objectives including economic, political, and social objectives.

In a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1940, at the time when the German tanks were smashing through Belgium and the Netherlands, the Secretary remarked that it appeared more and more evident that no country was safe from aggressive intervention by one or another and that the only thing a nation could do was to "arm to the teeth" and be ready for any serious interference with its rights and interests by military force or threat of force. However, he continued, this Government was striving for peace year in and year out and our

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Def. Doc. # 401 (38)

- 2 -

constant desire was to promote and preserve peace both with other countries and among other countries.

The Secretary then brought to the attention of the Ambassador a report from Tokyo which indicated that Japanese newspapers were emphasizing some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands Indies. The Secretary said it seemed very surprising that Japan, after endeavoring to spread itself over the huge Republic of China, might not be content unless it extended itself to take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view to shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations. The Ambassador replied that his Government was satisfied with the Netherlands Indies situation and had no plans or purposes to proceed there.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
(Official Publication)
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 89 and 90

*not used**37*

Defense Document 401 (40)

TEMPORARY CLOSING OF THE BURMA ROAD

In the middle of July 1940 reports became current that the British Government, at the instance of the Japanese Government, would prohibit temporarily the movement of certain commodities through Burma into China. On July 16, Secretary of State Hull, in reply to inquiries by press correspondents in regard to these reports, made comment that the United States Government had a "legitimate interest in the keeping open of arteries of commerce in every part of the world" and considered that action such as this, if taken, "would constitute unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade". On July 18 the foreshadowed restrictions were, under the provisions of a British-Japanese agreement, imposed by British authorities for a period of three months. Upon expiration of the term of the agreement under reference, these restrictions were lifted by the British authorities at midnight, October 17, 1940.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official Publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 91

Not used 36

REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR GRE

The United States Ambassador in Japan cabled to the Secretary of State on September 12, 1940 that whatever the intentions of the existing Japanese Government, there could be no doubt that the military and other elements in Japan saw in the world situation a "golden opportunity" to carry their dreams of expansion into effect; that the German victories, "like strong wine", had gone to their heads; that they had believed implicitly until recently in Great Britain's defeat; that they had argued that the war would probably be ended in a quick German victory and that Japan's position in Greater East Asia should be consolidated while Germany was still agreeable; and that, although carefully watching the actions of the United States, they had discounted effective opposition on our part.

However, the Ambassador went on, a gradual change could now be sensed, as it was beginning to be seen by the Japanese that Germany might not defeat Great Britain after all. The Japanese saw Great Britain and the United States steadily drawing closer together in mutual defense measures. Furthermore, it was beginning to be questioned in Japan whether even a victorious Germany would not furnish a new hazard to their program of expansion. There was also an uncertain factor in their calculations regarding the future attitude of Russia. The Ambassador said that until the world situation, particularly the position of the United States, became clearer, Japan's "nibbling policy" appeared likely to continue.

Referring to the question of "sanctions", the Ambassador warned that the probability must be contemplated that drastic embargoes on such important products as oil would be interpreted in Japan as sanctions, and that some form of retaliation might and probably would follow. The risks, he said, would depend on the "do or die" temper of the Japanese Army and Navy should they impute to the United States the responsibility for the failure of their plans for expansion. The retaliation, he said, would probably be some sudden stroke by that Navy or Army without the prior authority or knowledge of the Government. Japan was, he said, one of the

predatory powers; having submerged all ethical and moral sense, it had become unashamedly and frankly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit through the weakness of others. He believed that United States interests in the Pacific were definitely threatened by Japan's policy of southward expansion. Japan, he said, had been deterred from taking greater liberties with our interests only because it respected our potential power; also, it had trampled upon our rights in exact ratio to the strength of its conviction that the people of the United States would not permit that power to be used. If, the Ambassador said, we could by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until Great Britain should be successful in the European war, it would be impossible for the opportunist philosophy in Japan to keep the upper hand; then it might be possible to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on an equitable basis. Until there was in Japan a complete regeneration of thought, he said, nothing but a show of force coupled with the determination that force would be used if necessary could effectively contribute to such an outcome and to the future security of the United States.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Force and War"
Official Publication
Department of State, U. S. G.
Pages 92 and 93

164 0002 05 14

Defense Document 401 (42)

not used



RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS TO JAPAN

The "moral embargoes" of 1938 and 1939, referred to previously, brought about the cessation of the export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautic equipment, and certain other materials. As the rearmament program in the United States gained momentum and required more and more available strategic materials, this Government gradually adopted measures, legislative and administrative, which resulted in a steady decline of export to Japan of such materials. The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 authorized the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools, beginning in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horikuchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act". The Secretary told the Ambassador that it was really "amazing" for the Japanese Government, which had been violating in the most aggravating manner American rights and interests throughout most of China, to question the fullest right of this Government to impose such an embargo. To go further and call it an "unfriendly act", the Secretary said, was still more amazing in the light of Japan's conduct in disregarding all law, treaty obligations, and other rights and privileges and the safety of Americans, while proceeding to an ever-increasing extent to seize territory by force. The Ambassador replied that he very much regretted the differences between Japan and the United States and that strife between them would be extremely tragic for both. Secretary Hull agreed that such an occurrence would be exceedingly unfortunate but added that this Government had been extremely patient. The Secretary went on to say that we stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice, along with genuine friendliness between

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

the two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those dominating the external policy of Japan were, "as we have here believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the south and in southern continental areas of that part of the world". Furthermore, we and all other nations were expected by Japan to sit perfectly quiet and be cheerful and agreeable, but static, while most of Asia was "Manchurianized", which would render practically impossible all reasonable or satisfactory relations so far as other nations were concerned, and would result ultimately in correspondingly lower levels of existence for the people of most of Asia.

The Secretary reiterated that it was unheard of for a country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third nation and seriously insist that the latter would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it did not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion. The Secretary made clear to the Ambassador this Government's view that Germany and Japan were undertaking to subjugate both of their respective parts of the world and to place them on an international order and a social basis resembling that of eight centuries ago.

Despite the Japanese protest, a total embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap to destinations other than countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain went into effect on October 16, 1940.

The effect of United States policy in regard to exports to Japan was that by the winter of 1940-41 shipment had ceased of many strategic commodities including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron, iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to war effort.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Excerpt from "Once and for All"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 93 and 94

not used

Def. Doc. No. 401 (42)

總設側文書四〇一（四二）

對日輸出制限

前にも述べた一九三八年（昭和十三年）並に一九三九年（昭和十四年）の「道義的通商禁止」は飛行機、航空用器具、其他或種資材日本向輸出中止を招來した。今衆國に於て再軍備計畫は調子づいて來て益々用ゐ得らるゝ限りの軍事資材を要するに至つたので、米國政府は法的且行政的對策を採るに至つた、その結果上記資材の日本向け輸出は著しく減退を來した。一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二日の輸出統制法は國防の爲めに基礎的或争用資材の輸出を禁止又は削減する權限を大統領に賦與した。本法により航空用ガソリン並に大部分の機械器具の日本向輸出免許狀は一九四〇年（昭和十五年）八月より拒否せられた。九月、鐵並に屑鐵の輸出は禁止せらるゝ旨發表せられた。から獨ノ内日本大使は一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月八日、これは「非友好的の行爲」である様に思はれるといつてハル國務



Def. Doc. No. 401 (42)

長官に抗議した。長官は斯る通商禁止を爲す本政府の至上權に異議を挟むことはそれこそ殆ど全支那に亘りアメリカの權益を最も侵略的な方法で以て侵害しつつあつた、日本政府にさう眞に「驚くべき」ことである。大使に語つた。更に進んで「非友好行爲」と呼ぶことは一方に於て斷へず益々武力に依つて領土の獲得を圖りつつあらゆる法律、條約上の義務、其他の權利並に米國人の幸福と安全とを無視する日本の行動に照して更に更に驚くべきことである。長官は語つた。大使は日本合衆國間の見解の相違を深く遺憾とする旨並に兩國間の紛争は兩者に極めて悲劇なるべき旨を答へた。ハル長官はさる事態の發生は甚だ不幸なるべき點に同感の意を表したが本政府は非常に忍耐して居ると附言した。長官は語を續けて我等は兩國間の眞の友好關係と共に法律秩序、條約尊重、正義を守るものであるが今や日本の對外政策を支配するものは「我々此地に在る者が過去數年間信に來つた如く、太平洋地域中價值ある領土はその範圍を^{此の}地域の南方並に南方大陸地區に限度を設けず總て武力を以て征服せんと決心して居る」ことは明らかにな

つた。更に我國其他各國は總て亞細亞の大部分が「滿洲化」される間全然靜かに座視し唱采し且つ贊成し而もちつとして居るものと日本は期待して言た、然し滿洲化といふものは諸外國に關する限り合理的な且つ満足な關係を總て事實上持續することは不可能で終局に於てそれに相當して亞細亞大部分の住民の生存水準は低下せらるる結果を招來すると語つた

長官は繰返して、あらゆる法律や條約上の規定に反して他國の侵略と奪取に従事する一國が第三國に向ひその侵略國が侵略政策を遂行するのを援助する爲め或る戰爭に必要な器具を欣然として供給しなかつたからさて之を非友誼的行爲を犯すものとして嚴しく主張するが如きは未だ聞いたことがないといつた。そして長官は獨逸と日本とは夫々の地域を征服し其處に八世紀前のものに似た國際秩序と社會組織を置かんと企圖してゐるこの本政府の見解を大使に明らかにした

日本の抗議に拘らず西半球諸國及英國以外を仕向地とする鐵道肩負の全輸出禁止は一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月十六日實施された

Def. Doc. No. 461 (42)

對日輸出に關する合衆國政策の效果は一九四〇年（昭和十五年）から一九四一年（昭和十六年）にかけての冬までに武器、彈藥、軍事裝具、空用ガソリン、其他多數の石油製品、機械器具、屑鐵、銑鐵、鐵鋼製品、銅、鉛、亜鉛、アルミナム、其他戰爭に大切な種々な物品を含む船積がばつたり止まつたことであつた

米國合衆國國務省刊行「平和と戰爭」九三頁及九四頁より抜萃す

Not used
INVASION OF GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

In October 1940 Italy had launched an unprovoked and ruthless attack on Greece. While the neutrality of the United States was proclaimed in the ensuing war between Greece and Italy, Minister MacVane at Athens was instructed on November 16 to inform the Greek Government that this action should be construed in no way as being an indication of any lessening of the sympathy of the United States for Greece in its conflict with Italy. In December 1940 President Roosevelt in a message to the King of Greece expressed the deep impression which had been made upon all free peoples by the courage and steadfastness of the Greek nation and assured him that, in line with our policy of furnishing aid to nations defending themselves against aggression, steps were being taken to extend such aid to Greece.

* * * * *

On February 9, 1941 Secretary Hull sent a message to our Minister to Yugoslavia making clear the position of the United States with respect to the developing world situation. The Secretary referred to the President's statement that "we are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain". This position, he said, continued to be the keystone of the national-defense policy of the United States; we were convinced that Great Britain would win. War-material production in the United States had been undertaken on a vast scale to meet the requirements of the British and would continue ever increasingly until the final victory.

* * * * *

GREENLAND AGREEMENT

The Department of State announced on April 10, 1941 the signing on the day before of an agreement regarding Greenland. This agreement recognized that as a result of the European war there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American Continent, and accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status. The agreement, after explicitly recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland, granted to the United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields and facilities for the defense of Greenland and of the American Continent. In announcing this agreement the Department stated that the United States had no thought "save that of assuring the safety of Greenland and the rest of the American Continent, and Greenland's continuance under Danish sovereignty"; that it was recognized that so long as Denmark remained under German occupation the Government in Denmark could not exercise the Danish sovereign powers over Greenland under the Monroe Doctrine. The agreement was signed by the Secretary of State and by the Danish Minister in Washington, acting as representative of the King of Denmark in his capacity as Sovereign of Greenland, and with the concurrence of the Governors of Greenland.

The Department announced that this step was taken in furtherance of the traditional friendliness between Denmark and the United States; that the policy of the United States was that of defending for Denmark her sovereignty over Greenland so that she might have a full exercise of it as soon as the German invasion of Denmark was ended. Accordingly the agreement provided that as soon as the war was over and the danger had passed, the two Governments should promptly consult as to whether the arrangements made by this agreement should continue or should then cease.

PLURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

POLICY TOWARD FRANCE

The policy of the United States toward France in its broad aspects was based primarily on steady opposition to German aggression. After the fall of France and the conclusion of the French-German armistice this policy was specifically directed toward (1) denial of the French Fleet and French naval and air bases to the Axis powers; (2) closest practicable cooperation with the French people for the purpose of aiding them to keep alive their aspirations for liberty and democracy and to attain their earliest possible liberation from their conquerors; and (3) constant exertion of influence against French collaboration, voluntary or involuntary, with Hitler and Hitlerism. Another vital consideration was the need of keeping the French people reminded that their commitments under the terms of the French-German armistice strictly defined the limits to which they, the French, were obligated as regards Germany.

The first fruit of continuing contact with the French Government was its pledge given on June 18, 1940, and repeated subsequent to the French-German armistice, that the French Fleet would "never be surrendered to the enemy".

On November 4, 1940, following indications of French collaboration with Germany, Secretary of State Hull conferred with French Ambassador Henry-Haye. The Secretary declared that "we propose to be on our guard" with respect to acts of the Vichy Government, inspired by Foreign Minister Laval, that were intended to aid the military activities of Hitler, such as the supplying of naval and air bases, or other help given by French military or naval forces. He said that while this Government recognized the unfortunate situation of France as a "captive nation" it maintained that the French Government had no justification to render the slightest military aid to Germany. The Secretary referred to what he called the "extreme pro-German plans" of Laval and said that there could be no appeasement of Hitler, that Hitler would do what he pleased with all of his captive nations regardless

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

of whether they offered him gifts and other considerations. He declared that the United States was too much concerned with possible future attacks by Hitler to acquiesce in the slightest degree in acts of the French Government that would aid Hitler in wider conquests, particularly in the direction of the Western Hemisphere.

In June 1941, when Germany was exercising increasing pressure upon the French Government at Vichy in order to obtain assistance from that Government in the conduct of the war, Secretary Hull, in a statement of June 5, reviewed the policy of the United States with respect to France. Throughout our history, the Secretary said, we had been sympathetic to the true aspirations of France; we had fought beside France; France's cause had been our cause; the principles of free representative government by the people had been the bases of the democratic institutions of both countries. We had, he said, consistently conveyed to the French Government our understanding of the difficulty of their position and our determination to be of every assistance we could in solving their problems for the ultimate benefit of the French people. We had made clear to the French Government that the basic policy of the United States was to aid Great Britain in her defense against the same forces of conquest which had invaded and were subjugating France. We had aided in the furnishing of foodstuffs for unoccupied France, and children's supplies were now being distributed through the American Red Cross. We had collaborated in safeguarding the welfare and maintaining the integrity of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. In cooperation with the French Government we had helped in supplying commodities urgently needed for the economic stability of French North Africa. The Vichy Government had been assured that the United States had no interest in any territories of the French Empire other than their preservation for the French people.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

It had been the determined policy of this Government, the Secretary said, to continue friendly and helpful cooperation with France in the existing difficult situation in which French action was restricted and limited by the terms of the armistices with Germany and Italy. It seemed scarcely

believable, he said, that the French Government should adopt a policy of collaboration with other powers for the purpose of aggression and oppression; such action would not only be yielding priceless rights and interests beyond the requirements of a harsh armistice, but would at once place France in substantial political and military subservience and would also make France in part an instrument of aggression; this could only be "utterly inimical to the just rights of other countries, to say nothing of its ultimate effects on the liberties, the true interests, and the welfare of the people of France".

Despite the collapse of resistance in France in June 1940 a number of French soldiers and sailors had continued to maintain the struggle against Germany on land and sea under the name of the "Free French". Portions of the French colonial empire rallied to their support. The Government of the United States entered into working arrangements with the Free French authorities in control of such territories, and a Free French delegation was established at Washington. In November 1941, President Roosevelt, finding that the defense of territory under control of Free French authorities was vital to the defense of the United States, directed that Lend-Lease aid be extended to them. This aid was given in such forms as the repair of naval vessels in American shipyards and the supply of tanks and other munitions to land forces.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
 Official publication
 Department of State, U. S. A.
 Pages 103-105

Defense Document 401 (49)

not used

GERMAN ATTACK ON RUSSIA

In the winter of 1940-41 this Government received reports that Germany intended to attack the Soviet Union, despite the existence of the German-Russian non-aggression pact. This information was conveyed by Under Secretary Welles to the Soviet Ambassador early in 1941. On March 20, 1941 Mr. Welles informed the Ambassador that this Government had additional information in confirmation of the report that Germany intended to attack the Soviet Union.

Hitler's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union occurred on June 22, 1941, when Germany launched an offensive along a front extending from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 105

0164 0002 0526

AGREEMENT WITH ICELAND

President Roosevelt announced to the Congress on July 7, 1941 that in accordance with an understanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces of the United States had arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British forces which have been stationed there to insure the adequate defense of that country. The President said that the United States could not permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic, to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere; that we had no desire to see any change in the existing sovereignty of those regions; that assurance that such outposts in our defense frontier remain in friendly hands was the very foundation of our national security and of the national security of every independent nation in the New World. It was imperative, therefore, that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts should remain open and free from all hostile activity or threat. As Commander in Chief the President had issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts. This Government, the President said, would insure the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state. He had given assurance to the Prime Minister of Iceland that the American forces sent there would in no way interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of that country, and that immediately upon the termination of the international emergency all American forces would be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their Government in full and sovereign control of their own territory.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 106

0 164 0002 0527

Defense Document 401 (52)

Not Used



AID TO RUSSIA

On August 15, 1941 a joint message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill was delivered to Joseph Stalin, President of the People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this message the President and the Prime Minister said that they had consulted together as to how best their two countries could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed; that many shiploads had left already for the Soviet Union and more would leave in the immediate future. In order that all concerned might be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of joint resources, they suggested that a meeting of representatives of the three Governments be held at Moscow. Realizing how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism was "the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union", they felt that they must act "quickly and immediately in this matter on planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources". The conference was agreed to and was held in Moscow shortly thereafter.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 108

D of Doc No. 401 (52)

護照側文書 四〇一（五二）

ロシアに對する援助

一九四一年八月十五日ルーズヴェルト大統領は、チャーチル首相の共同メツセーヂがソヴィエト社會主義共和國聯邦人民委員長ヨセフスターリンに送られた。このメツセーヂの中で大統領並びに英首相は兩國がソヴィエト聯邦を援助すべく最善の方法について協議したことを、最も緊急に要請される供給品の最大限度をソヴィエト聯邦に與へるべく協力し來つたこと及びソヴィエト聯邦向け多數の輸出し貨物が既に送り出されてをり更に近い將來もつと多くが送られる等であることを言明した。共同資源の分配について關係諸國を急速な決定に到達しうる立場に置くためにルーズベルト、チャーチル兩氏は三國政府代表者達の會合でモスクウで開くことを提議した。「勇敢にして搖ぎないソヴィエト聯邦の抗戦」がヒットラー一派の敗北に如何に致命的なほど重大なものであつたかを充分に知つてゐる。兩氏は「われわれの共同資源の今後の分配計畫問題に付いては



Not used

Defense Document 401 (53)

* * * * *

President Roosevelt [September 11, 1941] declared that the very presence of Axis submarines or raiders in any waters which America deemed vital to its defense constituted an attack. In those waters, the President said, "American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow -- first". Our naval and air patrol operating over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean would protect all merchant ships engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. It was no act of war on our part when we decided to protect the seas which were vital to American defense; the aggression was not ours.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 110

Defense Document 401 (54)

not used

* * * * *

The Congress passed, and the President approved on November 17, 1941, a joint resolution repealing sections 2, 3, and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939, thereby permitting United States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports anywhere.

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
(official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 112

0164 0002 0531

Def Doc No. 401 (54)

Not used

議院圖書類四〇一（五四號）

一九三九年中立法ノ第二、三及六節ヲ廢棄スル共同決議ハ一九四一年十一月十七日ニ議會ヲ通過シ且大統領ノ認可ヲ經タ。是ニ依リ、合衆國船舶ノ武裝化並ビニ交戰國諸港ヘノ積荷輸送ヲ認メルコトナツタノデアル。

米國國務省刊行

・戦争ト平和・ヨリノ抜萃

一一二頁ヨリ



Defense Document 401 (55)

not used

"WE AMERICANS HAVE CLEARED OUR DECKS AND TAKEN OUR BATTLE STATIONS"

Meanwhile, on October 17, 1941 the United States destroyer Kearny had been attacked and hit by a torpedo from a Nazi submarine and eleven men of the Navy were killed. President Roosevelt said in an address on October 27 that we had wished to avoid shooting but the shooting had begun and "history has recorded who fired the first shot". The purpose of Hitler's attack was, he said, to frighten the American people off the high seas; if our national policy were to be dominated by the fear of shooting, then all of our ships and those of the other American republics would have to be tied up in home harbors. Naturally we rejected that "absurd and insulting suggestion". Each day we were producing and providing more and more arms for the men who were fighting on actual battlefronts; it was this nation's will that these vital arms and supplies of all kinds should neither be locked up in American harbors nor sent to the bottom of the sea; it was the nation's will that "America shall deliver the goods". He emphasized that the orders to the United States Navy "to shoot on sight" were still in effect.

* * * * *

The President concluded his address with a statement that in the face of this newest and greatest challenge "we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations"; we stood ready "in the defense of our nation and the faith of our fathers to do what God has given us the power to see as our full duty".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 112

countries as to the full extent of Japan's contemplated conquests by force. He referred to the terms of the Tripartite Pact and to public declarations of Hitler and of Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota that their countries were out to establish by military force a new world order under their control. The Secretary said that, whatever interpretation the Ambassador might give these statements and military activities in harmony with them, the people of the United States had become thoroughly aroused and viewed with most serious concern the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and the other continents for their own arbitrary control and pecuniary profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims of such a course. He said that these apprehensions would remain so long as Hitler continued his "avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation by force of other and distant areas".

EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS

Meanwhile, reports had been received in the United States that elements in the Japanese Government and certain private groups in Japan would welcome negotiations between the two Governments looking toward a settlement of the issues between the United States and Japan.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull well realized the probability that Japan had already gone so far in a policy of conquest that it would be impossible to persuade her to stop. Nevertheless, entertainment of even a faint hope that there might be worked out a fair and peaceful settlement in the Far Eastern area impelled this Government to agree to participate in exploratory conversations in order to ascertain whether there was sufficient agreement on basic issues to warrant entry upon more formal negotiations. Furthermore, there was the desirability of guarding against Japan's advances upon the relatively weak defenses of United States territory in the western Pacific and of territory of friendly nations in that area.

Def. Doc. # 401 (56)

- 3 -

Accordingly, in the spring of 1941 the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador began a series of conversations in which they discussed the issues between the two countries. In a conversation on May 11 Secretary Hull told Ambassador Nomura that if Japan really desired a settlement of the Pacific situation on a basis of peace and friendliness, there should be no serious difficulty. The Secretary inquired why it was that Japan persisted in using the slogan "New Order in Greater East Asia" unless Japan was using it as a cloak to continue her policy of conquest by force. He repeated that we were profoundly convinced that Hitlerism would prove not only a "scourge" to other parts of the world, as it had in Europe, but that it would be applied to Japan herself just as quickly as it had been applied to countries in Europe which had trusted Hitler. The Ambassador said that it would be "an incalculable loss to both Japan and the United States, as well as to civilization, if our two countries should become engaged in war". The Secretary rejoined that unless the civilization of the world was to run the great risk of being destroyed by Hitler, the united efforts of nations like Japan, the United States, and Great Britain would be required to shape the course of the world in a different direction. He said that steps looking toward the gradual development of basic programs for both the transition and the post-war periods could not be taken too soon. He re-emphasized that the United States was determined that Hitler should not get control of the seas, and that we should feel obliged to resist indefinitely such effort on Hitler's part. Since Hitler had avowed his movement to be one for world control, the United States did not, he said, propose to commit suicide as so many countries in continental Europe had done, by trusting Hitler and waiting until it was too late to resist; we proposed to resist when and where such resistance would be most effective, whether within our own boundaries, on the high seas, or in aid of such countries as Great Britain.

Def. Doc. # 401 (56) - 4 -

JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF MAY 12

On the following day, May 12, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State, as under instruction from his Government, a proposal for a general settlement between the United States and Japan. This proposal served to reveal authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in mind as a basis for agreement.

The proposal contained in the beginning a statement expressing the hope that "our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific". It stated that the Tripartite Pact was "defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European war from engaging in it". It included an undertaking by the United States forthwith to "request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan". The Japanese stated that the United States would be expected also to "discontinue her assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime" in case the latter should decline to enter into such negotiations. They explained also that Japan's attitude toward China would include the principles of neighborly friendship; no annexations and no indemnities; independence of "Manchukuo"; mutual respect of sovereignty and territories; "withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China"; and joint defense against communism, which would involve the right of Japan to station troops in Chinese territory. The Japanese proposal contained also a mutual undertaking by the United States and Japan that each would supply the commodities which the other required; a mutual undertaking that steps would be taken to bring about resumption of normal trade relations between the two countries; and an undertaking by the United States that as "Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation should be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs". The proposal also contained an undertaking that the United States and Japan should "jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality".

UNITED STATES PROPOSAL OF JUNE 21

Although the Japanese Ambassador constantly professed his Government's desire to adopt peaceful courses and although the general provisions of the Japanese proposal of May 12 contained affirmations of Japan's peaceful intent, the Japanese Government insisted upon maintaining its alignment with the Axis, insisted upon the stationing of an unspecified number of Japanese troops in large parts of China for an indefinite period, refused to commit itself to a policy precluding the retention by Japan of a preferential economic position in China and in the Western Pacific, and refused to commit itself unreservedly to a general policy of peace. It was felt by the United States Government that an explicit understanding on these points was necessary in view of Japan's current course and in view of repeated affirmations by many responsible Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Katsuko, of Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with its Axis partners.

The Secretary of State, on June 21, 1941, handed to the Japanese Ambassador a document containing a comprehensive statement of the attitude of the United States. This included a proposal of the following points:

1. Affirmation by both Governments that their national policies were directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the two peoples.
2. A suggested formula that the "Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war" and that the "Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense." (PURL <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>)
3. A suggestion by the United States to China that

explanation of the United States concept of self-defense, the Japanese, in a separate statement, were referred to Secretary Hull's address of April 24, 1941; see page 100.)

Def. Doc. # 401 (56)

- 6 -

China and Japan enter into negotiations, provided that Japan first communicate and discuss with the United States the general terms which Japan contemplated proposing to China. 4. Mutual assurances by the United States and Japan that each would supply the other with such commodities as were required and were available and that steps would be taken to resume normal trade relations between the two countries. 5. Provision for cooperation between the two countries toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by peaceful means to supplies of natural resources which each needed. 6. A mutual affirmation that the basic policy of each country was one of peace throughout the Pacific area and a mutual disclaimer of territorial designs there. 7. A provision that Japan declare its willingness to negotiate with the United States, at such time as the latter might desire, with a view to concluding a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence should have been achieved.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 113-117

not used

REPORT OF JAPANESE PLAN TO ATTACK RUSSIA

On June 22, 1941 Hitler launched his invasion of Russia. Several days later, on July 4, a message was sent by this Government to the Japanese Prime Minister referring to reports which were being received from varied sources that Japan had decided to attack Russia. The message stated that such military conquest and aggression would destroy our hope that peace in the Pacific might not be disturbed anew but rather might be reinforced; that it was our sincere hope that such reports were incorrect; and that assurances to this effect by the Japanese Government would be appreciated.

The Japanese reply of July 8, 1941 was to the effect that prevention of the European war from spreading to the regions of Greater East Asia and preservation of peace in the Pacific area had always been the sincere and genuine desire of the Japanese Government; that the Japanese Government had not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 118

not used

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN INDOCHINA

Even before this time the United States Government had received reports that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This Government brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, pointing out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discussions which were then proceeding looking toward the conclusion of an agreement for peace in the Pacific. About July 22, as a result of pressure exerted by Axis authorities upon the Vichy Government, Japan was granted by the French the right to maintain troops and establish air and naval bases in southern Indochina. In explanation of this action the Japanese Ambassador informed Acting Secretary of State Welles on July 23 that Japan must be assured of an uninterrupted source of supply of rice and raw materials and other foodstuffs, whose flow to Japan might be obstructed by Chinese and DeGaulle activities in southern Indochina; and that the step taken was a safeguard against a policy of encircling Japan on which the latter believed certain powers were intent. The Acting Secretary replied that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; therefore, it was our judgment that this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world domination and conquest. He pointed out that the conclusion of the agreement which had been under discussion by the Secretary of State and the Ambassador would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could gain by occupation of Indochina. He said further that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States; that the United States could only

Def. Doc. # 401(58)

- 2 -

regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State -- with whom he had talked a few minutes before -- could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged.

On the following day, July 24, 1941, the Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles, stated to the press that the Japanese Government was giving clear indication that it was determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force; that there was no apparent valid ground upon which the Japanese Government would be warranted in occupying Indochina or establishing bases in that area as measures of self-defense; that there was not the slightest ground for belief that the United States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands had any territorial ambitions in Indochina or had been planning any moves which could be regarded as threats to Japan; that this Government could only conclude that the action of Japan was undertaken because of the estimated value to Japan of bases in that region primarily for purposes of further movements of conquest in adjacent areas. The Acting Secretary went on to say that these Japanese actions endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps which Japan was taking endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

On the afternoon of that same day, July 24, 1941, President Roosevelt received the Japanese Ambassador. The President told the Ambassador that the new move by Japan in Indochina created an exceedingly serious problem for the United States. The President said that the Japanese Government surely could not have the slightest belief that China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, or the United States had any territorial designs on Indochina or were in the slightest degree providing any real threats of

0 164 00002 0541

- 3 -

Def. Doc. # 401(58)

aggression against Japan. This Government consequently could only assume that the occupation of Indochina "was being undertaken by Japan for the purpose of further offense".

The President then made a proposal that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina with its military and naval forces, or, had these steps actually been commenced, if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces, the President would do everything within his power to obtain from the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States, a binding declaration, provided Japan would make a similar commitment, to regard Indochina as a neutralized area. This would imply that the powers concerned would not undertake any military act of aggression against Indochina and would not exercise any military control within or over Indochina. The President would further endeavor to procure from the other interested powers a guaranty that so long as the existing emergency continued, the local French authorities in Indochina would remain in control of the territory. If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs on Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which -- according to Japan's accounts -- Japan was seeking to secure.

The President then said that it was believed in the United States that such policies as Japan was pursuing were due to German pressure upon Japan; that the Japanese Government did not understand as clearly as we that Hitler was bent upon world domination; that if Germany succeeded in defeating Russia and dominating Europe and Africa, Germany thereafter would turn her attention to the Far East and to the Western Hemisphere; and that it was entirely possible that after some years the Navies of Japan and of the United States would be cooperating against Hitler as a common enemy.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

In the course of this conversation the President reminded the Japanese Ambassador that the United States had been permitting oil to be exported from the United States to Japan; that this had been done because we

realized that if these oil supplies had been shut off or restricted the Japanese Government and people would have used this as an incentive or pretext for moving down upon the Netherlands Indies in order to assure themselves of a greater oil supply; that the United States had been pursuing this policy primarily for the purpose of doing its utmost to preserve peace in the Pacific region; that our citizens were unable to understand why, at a time when they were asked to curtail their use of gasoline, the United States should be permitting oil supplies to go to Japan when Japan had given every indication of pursuing a policy of force and conquest in conjunction with the policy of world conquest and domination being carried on by Hitler. The President said that if Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands Indies, the latter would undoubtedly resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, and war would then result. In view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, "an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result". The President stated that with these facts in mind oil had up to this time been permitted to be shipped from the United States to Japan, notwithstanding the bitter criticism leveled against the administration.

President Roosevelt discussed this question in an informal talk at the White House on July 24. He explained the essential necessity, from the standpoint of our own defense and of that of Great Britain, of preventing war from breaking out in the South Pacific. He said that if oil supplies from the United States had been cut off, Japan probably would have attacked the Netherlands Indies to obtain oil and war would have resulted; that the policy of the United States in allowing oil to go to Japan had succeeded in keeping war out of the South Pacific, "for our own good, for the good of the defense of Great Britain, and the freedom of the seas".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 118-121

not used

JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 6

Notwithstanding the President's proposal of July 24 for the neutralization of Indochina, Japanese forces continued to move into southern Indochina. Not until August 6 was a reply received to the President's proposal. On that day the Japanese Ambassador presented a counter-proposal, according to which his Government would undertake not further to station its troops in the southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina; would withdraw the troops then stationed in French Indochina after settlement of the "China incident"; would guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands "at an opportune time"; and would cooperate with the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as were required by the United States. According to this counter-proposal, the United States on its part would suspend its "military measures" in the southwestern Pacific areas and, upon the successful conclusion of the conversations, would advise the Governments of Great Britain and of the Netherlands to take similar steps; would cooperate with the Japanese Government in the production and procurement of natural resources required by Japan in the southwestern Pacific areas; would take steps necessary for restoring normal trade relations between the United States and Japan; would use its good offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese Government and "the Chiang Kai-shek regime" for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China incident; and would recognize a special status for Japan in French Indochina, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area. On presenting this proposal the Japanese Ambassador explained that the Japanese measures taken in Indochina were absolutely necessary "to prevent from getting beyond control the Japanese public opinion which had been dangerously aroused because of the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands East Indies against Japan".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Dep. Doc. # 401 (60)

- 2 -

The Japanese counter-proposal disregarded the President's suggestion for the neutralization of Indochina and attempted to take full advantage -- military, political, and economic -- of the Japanese fait accompli in occupying southern Indochina. On August 8, 1941 the Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador that Japan's counter-proposal could not be considered as responsive to the President's proposal. The Ambassador then inquired whether it might be possible to arrange for a meeting of the responsible heads of the two Governments to discuss means of adjusting relations between the two countries.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 122

Not used

UNITED STATES - BRITISH COLLABORATION

* * * * *

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. It was agreed also that the United States should continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 123

Document 1,01 (62)

Not used

MAIL TO JAPAN

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull conferred with the Japanese Ambassador on August 17. The President handed the Ambassador a document stating that notwithstanding the efforts of the United States to reach a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries for the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific, the Government of Japan had continued its military activities and its disposals of armed forces at various points in the Far East and had occupied Indochina with its military, air, and naval forces. Therefore, the statement continued, the Government of the United States "finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States".

The President also handed Ambassador Nomura a document in reply to a request which the Ambassador had made of the Secretary of State for a resumption of conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion, advanced on August 8, that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister meet with a view to discussing means for an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan. In this document it was stated that in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Def. Doc. # 401 (62)

- 2 -

the informal exploratory discussions. It was also stated that before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans. The President said to the Ambassador that "we could not think of reopening the conversations" if the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 123 and 124

PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND
PRIME MINISTER KONOYE

Ten days later Prime Minister Kono of Japan sent to President Roosevelt a message which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador on August 28, 1941, urging that a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself be arranged as soon as possible for a frank exchange of views. The Prime Minister said in this message that the idea of continuing preliminary informal conversations and of having their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments did not meet the need of the existing situation, which was developing swiftly and which might produce unforeseen contingencies; that he considered it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the heads of the two Governments meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area.

Accompanying the Prime Minister's message was a statement by the Japanese Government giving assurances that Japan was seeking a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States Government had long been committed. However, the statement contained qualifications to the following effect: The Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union so long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention of using, "without provocation", military force against any neighboring nation.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

In a conversation with Secretary Hull on the same day, Ambassador Nomura said that the Prime Minister would probably proceed to the proposed meeting in a Japanese warship and would probably be assisted by a staff of officials from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy at Washington. The ambassador thought that the inclusion of

Def. Doc. # 401(63)

- 2 -

Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be "especially beneficial in view of the responsibility which they would share for the settlement reached". He said his Government was very anxious that the meeting be held at the earliest possible moment in view of the efforts of a "third country" and "fifth-columnists in Japan" to disturb Japanese-American relations.

In the same conversation Secretary Hull pointed out to the Ambassador the desirability of reaching an agreement in principle on the main issues prior to a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister. He said that should such a meeting be a failure the consequences would be serious and that, therefore, its purpose should be the ratification of essential points agreed upon in advance.

In a reply of September 2 to the Prime Minister's message President Roosevelt stated that he was very desirous of collaborating with the Prime Minister; that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications in some quarters of Japan of concepts which seemed capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between the President and the Prime Minister; that in these circumstances precaution should be taken toward insuring that the proposed meeting prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought; that these questions involved practical application of the principles fundamental to the achievement and maintenance of peace. The President repeated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest: respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo might be altered by peaceful means. PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

On September 6 Ambassador Grew reported by telegram that Prime Minister Fumimaro Toyota had said that from the beginning of the informal conversations in Washington he had had the warmest support of the responsible Japanese Army and Navy leaders. The Prime Minister also said that the Minister of War had agreed to have a full general accompany the Prime Minister to the conference;

that the Navy had agreed to send a full admiral; and that the Army and Navy vice Chiefs of Staff and other high officers who were in full sympathy with the Prime Minister's aims would also go.

In considering the Japanese proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister this Government took into consideration that during the exploratory conversations up to this time Japan had evidenced an intention to continue its program of aggression and domination in the Far East. This Government had in mind that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, who would attend the meeting, had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China; that he had proclaimed and given publicity to the basic principles which the Japanese Government presumably would insist upon in any peace agreement with China; that the Japanese Government had shown in the "treaty" which Japan had concluded in November 1940 with the Japanese puppet regime at Nanking how it proposed to apply these principles. This "treaty" contained provisions that Japan should, "in order to carry out the defence against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of Mengchiang and of Kother China for the necessary duration"; that China should "recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China"; that "while considering the requirements of China, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects" with respect to the utilization of resources.

This Government also had in mind that the military element in Japan, which would be heavily represented at the proposed conference, had been responsible for carrying on Japan's program of aggression since 1931 and that the Japanese military leaders had caused the Japanese Government to maintain in the conversations a rigid attitude and position.

Furthermore, if the proposed meeting accomplished no more than the endorsement of general principles, the Japanese Government would be free to make its own interpretation of these principles in their actual application. If the meeting ended without agreement the Japanese military leaders would be in a position to represent to their country that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.

In view of all these factors, this Government could not but feel that there was scant hope that the Japanese Government could be persuaded to undergo a change of attitude and that in any case it was essential to determine in advance of a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments whether there was in fact any basis for agreement.

JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 6

On September 6, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State a revised proposal. In that proposal it was stated that: 1. Japan would not make any military advances from French Indochina against any adjoining areas, and likewise would not, "without any justifiable reason", resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan. 2. The attitudes of Japan and the United States toward the European war would be "decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided". (The Japanese Ambassador said that the formulae contained in points 1 and 2 represented the maximum that Japan could offer at that time.) 3. Japan would "endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China". 4. The economic activities of the United States in China would "not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis". 5. Japanese activities in the southwestern Pacific area would be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, and Japan would cooperate

Def. Doc. # 401(63)

in the production and procurement by the United States of needed natural resources in the said area. 6. Japan would take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States. On its part the United States would undertake: to "abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair" (Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that this point referred to United States aid to Chiang Kai-shek); to reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point 5 referred to above; to "suspend any military measures" in the Far East and in the southwestern Pacific area; and to reciprocate immediately Japan's commitment expressed in point 6 above.

Some of the Japanese provisions were equivocal and ambiguous and some indicated a disposition by the Japanese Government to narrow down and limit the application of the fundamental principles with which the Japanese professed in the abstract to agree. The revised proposals were much narrower than would have been expected from the assurances given in the statement communicated to President Roosevelt on August 28.

On September 6 Ambassador Grew reported that it had been revealed in his talk with Prince Konoze on that day that the Prime Minister and therefore the Japanese Government wholeheartedly subscribed to the four points considered by the United States Government essential as a basis for satisfactory reconstruction of United States - Japanese relations. These had been set out in President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 to the Prime Minister's message. However, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Ambassador Grew some time later that although Prince Konoze had "in principle" accepted the four points, the Prime Minister had indicated that some adjustment would be required in applying them to actual conditions.

Throughout September 1941 the Japanese Government continued to urge upon the United States an early meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister. On September 23 the Japanese Ambassador told Secretary Hull that such a meeting would have a psychological effect in Japan by setting Japan on a new course; that it would counteract the influence of pro-Axis

- 6 -

Def. Doc. # 401 (63)

elements in Japan and provide support for the elements desiring peaceful relations with the United States. During conversation with Secretary Hull on September 29, the Ambassador said that if the proposed meeting should not take place it might be difficult for the Konoys regime to stay in office and that if it fell it was likely to be followed by a less moderate government. The Ambassador handed to Secretary Hull a paper expressing the views of the Japanese Government on the proposed meeting. In this it was stated that the meeting "would mark an epochal turn for good in Japanese-American relations"; that should the meeting not take place there might never be another opportunity and the repercussions might be "most unfortunate". It stated that the ship to carry the Prime Minister was ready; that his suite, including a full general and a full admiral, had been privately appointed; that the party was prepared to depart at any moment. Finally, it stated that any further delay in arranging for the meeting would put the Japanese Government in a "very delicate position" and again emphasized that there was urgent necessity for holding the meeting at the earliest possible date.

The reply of the United States to the Japanese proposal of September 6, 1941 was contained in a statement made by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. After reviewing the progress of the course of the conversations thus far, the Secretary stated that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area. The Secretary said that the United States Government had welcomed the suggestion for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, but while desiring to proceed with arrangements as soon as possible, felt that clarification of certain principles was necessary to insure the [Public Law 76-140, 1959](http://www.legalhistory.org/doc/55c0c0/). He remarked that from what the Japanese Government had indicated, it contemplated a program in which the basic principles put forward by the United States would in their application be circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions. Secretary Hull asked whether, in view of these circumstances, the

Def. Doc. # 401(63)

Japanese Government felt that the proposed meeting would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which the two Governments mutually had in mind. He reported the view of the United States that renewed consideration of the fundamental principles would be helpful in seeking a meeting of minds on the essential questions and laying a firm foundation for the meeting.

The Japanese Ambassador, after reading this statement, expressed the fear that his Government would be disappointed, because of its earnest desire to hold the meeting. Secretary Hull replied that we had no desire to cause any delay but felt there should be a meeting of minds on the essential points before the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister was held.

The conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador at Washington continued, but the issues between the Governments appeared no nearer settlement. The chief questions on which agreement seemed impossible were Japanese obligations to Germany and Italy under the Tripartite Pact; the question of adherence by Japan to a basic course of peace; and the terms of settlement of the conflict between Japan and China, particularly the matter of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China. In regard to the last point this Government throughout the negotiations maintained that any settlement involving China must provide fully for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country; otherwise there would be no prospect of stable peace in the Pacific area. With reference to the Tripartite Pact, there was implicit throughout the discussions a Japanese threat that if the United States should become involved in war with Germany the Japanese Government, in accordance with the terms of the pact, would make war on the United States.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 124-130

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Not used

AMBASSADOR GREN'S REPORT THAT WAR MIGHT BE "INEVITABLE"

In a telegram of November 3, 1941 Ambassador Gren reported to the Department of State on the current situation in Japan. He warned against acceptance of any theory that the weakening and final exhaustion of Japanese financial and economic resources would result shortly in Japan's collapse as a militarist nation. He pointed out that despite severe cuts in industrial output, the loss of most of Japan's commerce, and the depletion of national resources, such a collapse had not occurred; but instead there was being drastically prosecuted the integration of Japanese national economy. Events so far, he said, had given no support for the view that war in the Far East could best be averted by imposition of commercial embargoes. He said that considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course.

The Ambassador said it was his purpose to insure against the United States becoming involved in war with Japan through any misconception of Japanese capacity to plunge into a "suicidal struggle" with us. Although reason, he said, would dictate against such a happening, our own standards of logic could not be used to measure Japanese rationality. While we need not be overly concerned by the "bellicose" utterances of the Japanese press, it would be short-sighted to underestimate the obvious preparations of Japan; it would be short-sighted also if our policy were based on a belief that these preparations amounted merely to saber rattling. Finally, he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States.

Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became

Def. Doc. # 401 (64)

- 2 -

the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941 in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world -- on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out the Cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West", he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores". He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us".

On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that in calling attention to the necessity for vigilance against sudden Japanese naval or military attack in regions not then involved in the Chinese-Japanese conflict, he considered it probable that the Japanese would make use of every possible tactical advantage, including surprise and initiative. The Ambassador said that in Japan there was an extremely effective control over military information and that as a consequence it was unlikely that the Embassy would be able to give substantial warning.

not used

78

KURUSU SENT TO WASHINGTON

Early in November the Japanese Government informed this Government that it desired to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations. This Government at once responded favorably and, upon request by the Japanese Government, facilitated Mr. Kurusu's journey by arranging that priority passage be given him and his secretary on a United States trans-Pacific plane and that the scheduled departure of the plane from Hong Kong be delayed until Mr. Kurusu could reach Hong Kong from Tokyo.

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull conferred with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on November 17. It soon became clear in the course of this and subsequent conversations that Mr. Kurusu had brought no new material or plans or proposals.

During this conversation of November 17 the President expressed the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two countries and to bring about a fair and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; he accepted a statement of the Japanese Ambassador that this was also the desire of Japan. The President stated that, from the long-range point of view, there was no occasion for serious differences between the United States and Japan.

Secretary Hull said that any settlement for the Pacific area would not be taken seriously while Japan was still "clinging" to the Tripartite Pact; that since Hitler had announced that he was out for unlimited-invasion objectives and had started on a march across the earth, the United States had been in danger and this danger had grown with each passing week; that the United States recognized the danger and was proceeding with self-defense before it was too late; that the United States felt the danger so acutely that it had committed itself to the expenditure of many billions of dollars in self-defense.

Def. Doc. # 401 (65)

- 2 -

The Secretary said the belief in this country was that the Japanese formula for a new order in greater East Asia was but another name for a program to dominate all of the Pacific area politically, economically, socially, and otherwise, by military force; that this would include the high seas, the islands, and the continents, and would place every other country at the mercy of arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program did in Europe and the Japanese program did in China.

Mr. Kurusu reiterated that ways must be found to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between the two countries and said that all the way across the Pacific "it was like a powder keg". Referring to the relations of Japan and Germany, he said that Germany had not up to then called upon Japan to fight.

Secretary Hull conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary said that we were trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order; that this was what we wanted to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that the present situation was exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods needed by peaceful countries, if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind; that it would be difficult for him to cause this Government to go far in removing the embargo unless it were given reason to believe that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest.

Mr. Kurusu expressed the belief that the two Governments should now make efforts to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation. He suggested that perhaps after the termination of the Sino-Japanese conflict it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but said that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation

could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the courses which this Government advocated.

Our people did not trust Hitler, the Secretary said, and we felt that it was inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if successful, get abroad to the Far East and "double-cross" Japan. He cited the instance when Germany, after concluding an anti-Comintern pact with Japan, had surprised Japan later by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia, and finally had violated the non-aggression pact by attacking Russia. The Secretary expressed great doubt that any agreement between the United States and Japan, while Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler, would carry the confidence of our people. He considered the Tripartite Pact inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding. He said that frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we could go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us "to stand and take the consequences".

Mr. Kurusu replied that he could not say that Japan would abrogate the Tripartite Pact but intimated that Japan might do something to "out-shine it". He said that Japan would not be a "cat's paw" for Germany; that Japan had entered into the Tripartite Pact in order to use the pact for its own purposes and because it felt isolated; that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of relations between the two countries; that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while still in a position to fight.

JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 20

(On November 20 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State a proposal comprising mutual commitments: to make no armed advance into regions of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific area excepting French Indochina (where Japanese troops were then stationed), to cooperate with a view to "securing the acquisition of those . . . commodities which the two governments need in Netherlands East Indies", and

Def. Doc. # 401 (65) - 4 -

to undertake "to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets"; commitments by the United States to undertake to supply Japan "a required quantity of oil" and "to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China" (which, the Japanese orally explained, meant that the Government of the United States was to discontinue its aid to the Chinese Government); and a commitment by Japan to undertake to withdraw its troops then in Indochina either upon restoration of peace between Japan and China or upon "the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area" and "upon the conclusion of the present arrangement" to remove to northern Indochina the troops that it then had in southern Indochina (which would have left Japan free to increase its armed forces in Indochina to whatever extent it might desire).

During a conversation on that same day with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull said that Japan could at any moment put an end to the existing situation by deciding upon an "all-out" peaceful course; that at any moment Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call "encirclement".

The Secretary said the people of the United States believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain and that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one half of the world and Japan the other half. The existence of the Tripartite Pact and the continual harping of Japan's leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type, the Secretary said, served to strengthen this belief; what was needed was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people opposed the idea of a "new order" under military control.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

In this conversation the Japanese representatives reiterated that their Government was really desirous of peace and that Japan had "never pledged itself to a policy of expansion". Secretary Hull remarked that the

Chinese "might have an answer to that point". Then Mr. Kurusu declared that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact, the Secretary observed that Japan did not take a similar view of the Nine-Power Treaty. Mr. Kurusu replied to the effect that the latter treaty was twenty years old and "outdated".

During a conversation on November 22 the Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Far East and that there had been a discussion of the question whether there could be some relaxation of freezing; that there was a general feeling that the matter could be settled if the Japanese could give some evidence of peaceful intentions. The Secretary said that if the United States and other countries should see Japan pursuing a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she desired.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 131-134

Not used

UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 26

In all of the various formulae which the Japanese Government offered in succession during the course of the conversations statements of pacific intent were qualified and restricted. As each proposal was explored it became clear that Japan did not intend to budge from the fundamental objectives of its military leaders. Japan manifested no disposition to renounce its association with Hitlerism. It insisted that its obligations under the Tripartite Pact -- a direct threat to this country -- would be fulfilled by Japan. Japan was willing to affirm its adherence to the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, but refused to relinquish in practice the preferential position which it had arrogated to itself in all areas under Japanese occupation. Japan insisted on obtaining in its hostilities with China a victor's peace and on having our assent thereto. Japan refused to make practical application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It was steadily adding to its armed establishment in Indochina; and it insisted upon continuing to maintain its armed forces in large areas of China for an indefinite period -- clearly indicating an intention to achieve a permanent control there.

It was thus evident that it was illusory any longer to expect that a general agreement would be possible. It was also clearly apparent that the Japanese were attempting to maneuver the United States into either accepting the limited Japanese proposals or making some sort of an agreement which would serve only the ends of Japan, and that without trying to solve basic questions they were seeking to evade serious consideration of an equitable broad-gauge settlement such as had been under discussion in the earlier stages of the conversations. A clear manifestation was given by the Japanese Government that it would not desist from the menace which it was creating to the United States, to the British Empire, to the Netherlands

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

, Indies, to Thailand, and to China by the presence of large and increasing bodies of Japanese armed forces in Indochina.

The Government of the United States still felt obliged, however, to leave no avenue unexplored which might conceivably cause Japan to choose a better course. Moreover, if the Japanese proposal of November 20 was indeed Japan's "last word", it was obviously desirable that record of the United States Government's position before, at the beginning of, throughout, and at the end of the conversations be made crystal clear. Therefore, toward possibly keeping alive conversations looking toward inducing Japan to choose the pathway of restraint, and toward making its position utterly clear, this Government formulated a new statement.

On November 26, 1941 the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan. In a statement accompanying the proposal it was said that the United States earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuation of discussions with the Japanese Government; that the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted in some respects with the fundamental principles to which each Government had declared it was committed; that the United States believed that these proposals were not likely to contribute to insuring peace in the Pacific area; and that further effort should be made to resolve the divergent views. With this object in mind, the United States was offering for the consideration of Japan a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisaged as something to be worked out during future conversations.

The proposal contained mutual affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that they had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to the following fundamental principles: inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality, including equality of commercial opportunity

Def. Doc. # 401 (66)

- 3 -

and treatment; and reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies. There was also provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples certain enumerated liberal principles.

The proposal contemplated the following mutual commitments: to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with its capital temporarily at Chungking; to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to obtain the agreement of other governments now enjoying such rights to give up these rights; to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers should be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this proposed agreement; and to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this proposed agreement.

The proposal envisaged a situation in which there would be no foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Withdrawal of the last armed forces of the United States from China was then in progress and had almost been completed and withdrawal of British armed forces from China had already been completed. Accordingly there was suggested one unilateral commitment, an undertaking by Japan that she would "withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

After the Japanese representatives had read the document, Mr. Yurusu said that when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese Government, that Government would be likely to "throw up its hands";

Def. Doc. # 401 (66)

- 4 -

that this response to the Japanese proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of the negotiations. The Japanese representatives then asked whether they could see the President.

President Roosevelt, with Secretary Hull present, received Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on November 27. The President stated that people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific area; that he had not given up yet, although the situation was serious. He said that this Government had been very much disappointed by the continued expressions of opposition by Japanese leaders to the fundamental principles of peace and order. This attitude on the part of the Japanese leaders had created an atmosphere, both in the United States and abroad, which had added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

The President called attention to the fact that this Government had been very patient in dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation; that we were prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's course of action permitted continuance of such an attitude on our part. He said that this country could not bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gave some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurred we could take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

The Secretary said everyone knew that the Japanese slogans of "co-prosperity", "new order in East Asia", and the "controlling influence" in certain areas were all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social, and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered. As long as the Japanese moved in that direction and continued to increase their military and other relations with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, no real progress

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

0164 0002 0566

Def. Doc. # 401 (66) - 5 -

could be made toward a peaceful solution. During this conference the Japanese representatives had little to say except to express their disappointment at the small progress made thus far.

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
(Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 135-138

- 5 -

not used

"JAPAN MAY MOVE SUDDENLY"

On November 25 and on November 26, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will not go to the officials of the Army and Navy". He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Page 138

Not used

40

REPORTED JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS

Secretary Hull conferred with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1. The Secretary said that in the current discussions we had to take into account the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo. He emphasized that we did not propose to go into partnership with Japan's military leaders; that he had not heard one whisper of peace from them, "only bluster and bloodcurdling threats". The Japanese representatives said that statements of Japanese officials were taken more seriously in the United States than was warranted; that these statements were misquoted in the press.

The Secretary said that this Government had no idea of trying to bluff Japan and that he saw no occasion for Japan's trying to bluff us; he emphasized that "there is a limit beyond which we cannot go".

He made clear that this Government was anxious to help settle the China affair if a settlement could be reached in accordance with the basic principles discussed in the conversations, and that under such circumstances we would be glad to offer our good offices. He said that under existing circumstances, while Japan was bound in the Tripartite Pact, Japan might just as well ask us to cease aiding Britain as to cease aiding China. The United States would give Japan all the materials it wanted, he said, if Japan's military leaders would only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.

The Secretary observed that Japanese troops in Indochina constituted a menace to the South Seas area; that the stationing of these troops in Indochina was making it necessary for the United States and its friends to keep large numbers of armed forces immobilized in East Asia; that in this way Japan's acts were having the effect of aiding Hitler. He called attention to reports of heavy Japanese troop movements in Indochina, stating that we could not be sure what the Japanese military leaders were likely to do. The Secretary said that we could not "sit still" while these developments were taking place; that we would not allow ourselves to be driven out of the Pacific. He

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Des. Doc. # 401 (68)

- 2 -

said that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan; that Japan did not have to use a sword to gain "a seat at the head of the table".

The Ambassador said the Japanese people believed that the United States wanted to keep Japan fighting with China and to keep Japan strangled; that the Japanese people were faced with the alternatives of surrendering to the United States or of fighting. Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government had directed him to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to request that the United States Government make "deep reflection of this matter".

Meanwhile, this Government received reports of continued Japanese troop movements to Indochina. In a communication of December 2, handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Under Secretary Hulls, President Roosevelt inquired regarding these reports and asked to be informed of the actual reasons for these steps. The President stated that the stationing of increased Japanese forces in Indochina seemed to imply the intention to utilize these forces for further aggression; that such aggression might be against the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, Malaya, or Thailand.

On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador handed to Secretary Hull a reply which stated that as Chinese troops had recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indochina bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object mainly of taking precautionary measures, had been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina; that as a natural sequence of this step, certain movements had been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory; and that an exaggerated report had been made of these movements.

In a conversation which followed with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu, the Secretary said that he had been under the impression that Japan had been moving forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there; that he had never heard before that these troop movements were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack.

Ambassador Nomura said that the Japanese were alarmed over the increasing naval and military preparations of the "ABCD powers"; that the United States blamed Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina were controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. Mr. Kurusu said that if an agreement could be reached on temporary measures, we could proceed with the exploration of fundamental solutions; that what was needed immediately was a temporary expedient.

The Secretary said that we could solve matters without delay if the Japanese Government would renounce its policy of force and aggression. He added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time "we were not running away from menaces".

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 138-140

Defense Document 401 (69)

not used

1-

PEARL HARBOR

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, at 7:50 a.m. Honolulu time (1:20 p.m. Washington time) the Japanese Government brought discussions to an end with the surprise attack upon the United States at Pearl Harbor. One hour after that attack had begun, and while Japanese planes were sowing death and destruction in Hawaii, and simultaneously were attacking the United States and Great Britain in the Far East, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at the Department of State and handed him a memorandum. In that memorandum the Japanese Government stated that the United States had "resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China" and had "attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions"; that in the negotiations the United States had "failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation"; that the United States had "made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek"; that it "may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war"; that it was engaged "in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe"; that the demands of the United States for the "wholesale evacuation of troops" from China and for unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce "ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia"; that the United States proposal of November 26 "ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige"; that obviously it was the intention of the United States "to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia"; and finally, that "in view of the attitude of the American Government"

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

Def. Doc. # 401 (69) - 2 -

the Japanese Government "cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations".

* * * * *

Several hours after the beginning of the Japanese attack Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the above-described memorandum, which had been delivered at Washington, was desired by the Emperor to be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's message. At the same time, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister made an oral statement to the Ambassador also "as a reply" from the Emperor to the President to the effect that the establishment of peace "in the Pacific and consequently of the world has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made the Government to continue its earnest endeavors".

* * * * *

Excerpt from "Peace and War"
Official publication
Department of State, U. S. A.
Pages 141 and 142

Defense Document 401 (70)

XV UNITED NATIONS

38

Shortly after war came to the United States this Government proposed that the nations arrayed against the Axis powers join together in a declaration pledging cooperation in the prosecution of the war and agreeing not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. As a result, there was signed at Washington such a declaration, dated January 1, 1942, by representatives of the following Governments: United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. It is open to adherence by "other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism". During 1942 it was adhered to by Mexico, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and Ethiopia.

This document, "Declaration by United Nations", states that the signatory Governments subscribe to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter and are "convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world". Each signatory pledges itself "to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war"; and "to cooperate with the Government signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies".

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

164 00002 0574

Defense Document 401-B(1) -- (Corrected)

not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

It was the opinion of the responsible officials of the Government, including the highest military and naval authorities, that adoption and application of a policy of imposing embargoes upon strategic exports to Japan would be attended with serious risk of retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to this country's becoming involved in war. Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by show of superior force, involves serious risk of war.

(Page 88)



0 164 0002 0575

Defense Document 401-B(2) -- (Corrected)

Not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

In 1939 this "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to plans, plants, and technical information for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline. These measures resulted in the suspension of the export to Japan of aircraft, aeronautical equipment, and other materials within the scope of the moral embargoes. As Japanese purchases in the United States of "arms, ammunition, and implements of war", other than aircraft and aeronautical equipment, were relatively unimportant, these operated ultimately to stop the export of arms to Japan.

(Page 89)



0164 0002 0576

Defense Document 401-B(3) -- (Corrected)

not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

.in July 1939 this Government gave notice of
termination of that treaty at the end of the six-month period
prescribed by the treaty. That termination removed the legal
obstacle to an embargo by the United States upon the shipment of
materials to Japan.

(Page 91)



0 164 00002 0577

Defense Document 401-B(4) -- (Corrected)

not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

The President summoned Congress to convene in extra session on September 21. In an address to the Congress he recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our citizens and our ships be kept out of dangerous areas in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. Public opinion in the United States rallied in support of this program. After a few weeks of debate there was enacted into law on November 4 substantially the program of May 27, with the addition of provisions prohibiting the arming of United States merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade and prohibiting such vessels from carrying cargoes to belligerent ports.

(Pages 69, 70)



0 164 00002 0578

Defense Document 401-B(5) -- (Corrected)

Not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940, authorized the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools, beginning in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act".

(Page 97)



0164 00002 0579

Defense Document 401-B(6) -- (Corrected)

Not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

On July 26, 1941 President Roosevelt issued an Executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. This order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved, and the effect of this was to bring about very soon the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

(Page 127)



PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/55c0c0/>

0 164 00002 0580

Defense Document 401-B(10) --(Corrected)

not used

Excerpt from "Peace and War", United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

In a telegram of November 3, 1941 Ambassador Grew reported to the Department of State on the current situation in Japan. He warned against acceptance of any theory that the weakening and final exhaustion of Japanese financial and economic resources would result shortly in Japan's collapse as a militarist nation. He pointed out that despite severe cuts in industrial output, the loss of most of Japan's commerce, and the depletion of national resources such a collapse had not occurred; but instead there was being drastically prosecuted the integration of Japanese national economy. Events so far, he said, had given no support for the view that war in the Far East could best be averted by imposition of commercial embargoes. He said that considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course.

(Page 136)

